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IITRODUOTIOI 
Kierkegaard is often represented as an irrationalist 
and his philosophy of faith is regarded as a "leap 
into the lap of God11 away from reason. The contention 
has a modicum of truth, inasmuch as it draws attention 
to the pre-eminent role of faith in Kierkegaard's 
philosophy but is nonetheless a misinterpretation 
which has its basis in 'an inadequate understanding 
of the nature of faith itself• 
The nature and role of faith and reason are 
expounded mainly in Kiekerraard's two chief "Philo-
sophical ^ orkss PhUpsoohical Pra?n--->ito and Oonclu^ injg 
^i^o^i^tifiQ^ PoB^ b^soript^  The latter in particular 
contains a detailed exposition wherein two asnects 
of faith emerge; the' !lSocratic form of faith11 and 
Christian faith, which is referred to as flfaith 
sensu eminentifl» Socratic faith is a leap, an act 
of the will in the presence of objective uncertainty; 
and Christian faith is the free affirmation of a 
phenomenon which objectively is a manifest absurdity* 
Both, forms of faith are expressions of the source of 
existential certitude in the face of the inadequacy 
of reason* Reason thus loses its supremacy but is 
by no means annihilated for the source of existential 
certitude is "inwardness11 which is the entire personality 
2 
affimed, possessed and expressed in decisiveness, 
11
 an inwardness of th«* v/hole boincr for r*hieh thought 
1 possesses no other ex*ressi^n but faith"* Of the 
person jiity thus concretised in the decisiveness 
of faith reason is necessarily a part* It regains 
active as the source of tension in the continual 
striving that is faith* It provides faith with its 
friskff its f s i^ renuosity1 , its f seventy thousand 
fathoras of water1 • To overlook this elenent of 
tension or ftenntation1 is to misunderstand 
Iinriregaardfs notion of faith* It is to lose si^ht 
of the fact that faith is essentially a 'militant 
certitude1, a constant becoming* The uncertainty 
engendered oj reason is thus essential xo faith* 
Faith Presupposes reason* 
nevertheless, the point of departure of 
Kierkegaard's philosophy is the repudiation of 
Hegelian pure thought which he often equates with 
reason itself# He^writes; 
"Let a doubting youcb, an existing douhtor, 
imbued with a lovable and unlimited youthful 
confidence in a hero of thought, confidingly 
seek in Hegel1s positive philosoohy the 
truth, the truth for existence: he will 
write a fomidable epigran over Jlefrel »»»• 
let him submit himself unconditionally, 
in feainine devotion, hut with sufficient 
vigour of deterrax^ation to hold fast to 
1 Soren li^rke^aard, fiither/py II, Tr# Walter Lowrie 
and Howard A. J olmsmTT^oKoT Books Double day & 
Co., Inc., 1^59), P* 204. 
5 
his nrohlen: he will become a s a t i r i s t 
without suspecuing i t . The youth i s an 
exiscin^ doubter* Hovering in do^bt and 
without a foochold for h is l i f e , he reaches 
oat for the t ru th in order to exis t in i t . 
He i s negative and the ohilosophv of Tief*e3 
i s jositive-—-what wonder tha t he seeks 
anchorage in tfecrel. But a ohilosonhy of 
pure thought i s for an rxxst in^ in i lvidunl 
a chimera, i f che truth tha t i s sought i s 
something to exis t i n . To ^xis t une^r 
the guidance of ure thought i s l i ke 
t r a v e l l i n g in Denmark ^ rith the help of a 
sTQaQ nan of Europe, on vhich Denmark shoves 
no l o r r e r than a s t ee l pen-point—aye, i t 
i s s t i l l more iuDOSGible." 2 
The search, t i ^ n , i s for the t ru th in order to 
ex is t in i t , a^a i t i s on th i s c r i t e r i o n uhat Pure 
thought, end a lso abs t rac t thought, are found 
wanting. 7ar fron vie«dine a l i f e v i r^ f o^ey in 
f-ex emsci l a t e existence i tsoLf. Pure chc •***!» t 
swallows uo uhe indxvid i r l in an iden t i t y o" ubou^bt 
and beinp; abs t rac t thought reduces ^ini to a ^haco"', 
vxth the r e s u l t uKit the e th ic i l , the decisive net 
the ac t i ve , hich i s Precisely fcpo individu I , i s 
obscured* 
"The objective tendency whioh proposes to 
na^e everyone an observer, ani in i t s naxi-
oiuji xo transform bin into so obj^ccive an 
observer tne t he becones alnost^a p-host, 
scarcely to be olsxiniruished from the 
•ere le I^OUS s p i r i t of t »e d^toricfil )ast~-• 
t h i s tendency »acurally refuses to know 
or 1 into i to anythinr except what stnnds 
in r e l a t ion to i t s e l f **••• Poi i t i s 
2 Soren Ilier re^dard, Concluli \J Unscient i f ic l o s t s c r ip t 
Tr# DavLd 1\ r>fi iaon ^d T7alter Lo SF™(P^i^ceton: 
Priiceuon Univ>rs«*cy Press , 1911, 1 68), p . 275. 
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r^or ' ed os a ebxlcd ^hin^, h i . uhe objective 
tende joy in t e^ h ruction o " inx <L1 ec ual 
oo^e i ilauioi, i^, in *e ne^er 1 i » ^ ^ ^ tn c 
usa^e, i^ ho e^bhical ^nswer to th<=» nu^stion of 
wh t^ T e,iJ'yicrlly^eve to do . . . . . nhc 
obiootxv^ teniency is the way and che t ivtbj 
t^e ethical is becoming an obs^rv^r! ^h^x 
the individual n in t becone an observer is 
"^
 ! e
 fthic.^1 ai^wer to the problem o? l i f°— 
or elie on^ is co ne1led to assume tbdt 
there is no ^ihxcal question at a l l , and 
n^ so for no ethical answer.M 5 
The tas>, oben, i° to rescue thp individual 
fro1 objectivxsn p.oa re-define and reinstate the 
ethicnl
 # ""'at in dom^ so i t ^u t not be oreotben 
th^t the snh^ect is an exx^xxn- iidividu 1, a concrete 
entity, °n "entice a^n11 endowed ^ith thought as ^oll 
as feolin*" on^ 1 iTiarfxi ition# The purpose ^ius is not 
to do away with thinMn^, which, ot any rat , is an 
iwpo isxbil it"'** On ~thr% c^ntr^rv, the •» rubier is io 
"interpenetrate existence with thouphtf1# Tt is in 
the li-nb of this criterion thnt Socrates ener^es as 
the arc -iivi vid u 1,
 whe arc* *f- )0 o+" tne ifsi nl e v/ise 
nantf rwho e P3l oy^d T,honi ht not to deny existence but 
to exist lore f^lly as an individual. 
"bet us no" look to see, ies~ syite iatically 
and iore 3ir»ol r , how he con looted himself 
while he l iv^ 1 , when he went about in niblio 
nlacos snd nocked the do^hists, when b° was 
a t.un^n oeinx, and, even in the uonl ridicu-
lous situation that has b^en preserved for 
costert uy • • • • • W* en, because Xanthinue had 
taien ms clothes and left thp hou^o, he 
threw a nelx arouni him and anieared thus 
5 C . U . P . , -o* 113 - 119 . 
5 
clad in the market nla.ce to the T e a t 
arixi^e^ient of his i n ends, s t i l l in t h i s 
s i tua t ion rernain^d a hu^an b<*inrf, and not 
nearly so r id iculous in h is ne»t as he 
1 ^xer becane in the Systen . . . • • Pid 
Socrates P*O about ta lk ing o^ *i n u ^ a^e 
dene ids, did b<* a ipr^h^nd t b a e t h i ca l as 
so i e th i i f to oe oiscovr>»ed, or which nad 
to be discovered by a prophet wx th a ^or ld -
h i s t o r i c outlook, or as son^thin^ to be 
determiner1 by an an eal to the bal lot-box? 
"o, 3ccrates tTas concerned only f i t h him-
se l f , and could not even count to five it 4 4ien i t ^as a quoqtion of counting votes*1 
Tins in Socrates e have th* exemplary e x i s t e n t i a l 
thinker Bm1 in Socrat ic f a i t h the node of t ru th in 
?7hich to ex i^ t . But ther^ i^ yet another aso^ct of 
exis tence , nan^ly, cue r e l i g ions , in iThich nassion 
wherein t ru th abides r *rcb**s ±ZB f u l l powe^. mhusf 
O h r i s t i a i i t ^ , vbich i s capable of e l i c i t i n r oh<=» 
respon-e of t^e h i -bes t oassion of inwardness on account 
of i t s o i ra^oxicai i ty becon^s the suprenely e x i r t e n t i a l 
xrutr , and the task before uhe exibt in^ individual 
becones ftPow bo become a 01 r i s bian11* for no onQ i s 
born a Christ ian but mst become one* 
flln xro aninal \ orld the ^axbicul^r sn^ciwen 
i s ^ i^ec t ly re la ted to the species as an 
exa nle of i t raid pa r t i c ipa te s i n e d i a a e l y 
in whatever development uhe sp^ci^s m y have***, 
But i t i s surely otherwise when n individual 
who i s qualif ied as s p i r i t s ands in r e l a t ion 
to a xei^r tion rocess . Or a ay re asounp that 
Christian naren^s ~1ve bi r th to Chris t ian 
cnildrenrf Chr i s t i an i ty a t l ea >t does not ; on 
the contrary, i t a^uro^s ^hat children b^rn of 
Christ ian par^n s are no i^ss s inful tha i ones 
4 C.U.F., p* 131 - 132. 
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born of D^pan parencs* Spiritual development 
is self-activity •. • • •fl 5 
Christianity thus becoxies »,arc of the existential 
dialectic and in the process is re-affirneti as an 
object of faith ratn^r than a doctrine. 
It is in c.ie li^ht of the preceding thau the 
problem of faith and reason assuneo ics full 
significance* 
In chanter one of this thesis I have aute-njpted 
a rest/ u »nent of the notion of faxxh ^ilb a vi^v to 
brinp; out the dialectical tension in xh^ two forms of 
faith. Chapter GVO contains an exposition of 
GierkeTaa,rdfs crixiquo of reason and the application 
of objpcxivis i to Christianity* The first section 
of the concludinp e'papt^ r contains an ex^o~ibion of 
the int^r-ro1ar;ionsbip of faith and reason and the 
socona section states Kierkegaard's notion of 
existential chinking and its application xo 
Christianity. 
5 O.T!#p#t o. 3^8 - 309, 
CTAP^R cm 
FAITH 
"•••there «nr*t after a l l be something ,%isoii-
1 fuished aooiu subjectivity," Kierkegaard writes, 
? because "faith in. :r^s in subjectivity"*'" In 
considering Ki^rlTe^aardf s nouion of faith, therefore, 
i t ay bo wel^  uo be^iJ T ith his inea of s jVeet iv i ty . 
Eierkor, ard ,'uto forty the cauecrorr of subjecti-
vity as a coirecuiva uo Ke^olian ideali^n. I t is 
basically a roitpraGioi of a „aoy to hion ^x-^rience 
aujesuS* narjely, chat thin'-in^ ri'ci t ly un jernLoO'l is 
an adjunct, to l i v i n g Thought begins as a« effort 
to uniers^aid ny rela.ion uo the Torld. 1 bojrLn xo 
think w a^n 1 aj farced irith Jie fact of an external 
reali ty vrhich contradicts my will and t;hus forces «e 
to acknowledge i t s presence and cor^ nelrs we to nouli 
iiiy will to i t s necessities. Thought has this ^riuordial 
ohnractoi of eoixainin^ within i t , or ha/viw as i t s 
purpose, a human objective. Ic is a relation between 
a subject an^ i an obi^cb; to think ac a l l is to affirm 
the real i ty of an f l f <mrl an 'ott^or1. 
Put thought teids to divest xtseiC of th<=> ' uiian 
inport. I t acquires an attraction as an activity ^er 
se; i t becoms an entertaining ^aie. Vh^ n this happens 
1 W h P M T>. 118* 
2 Ibidf p# 1 1 8 . 
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i t loses i t s i^aninfir as i t has je t t i soned th^ s u b l e t , 
tap se l f , i f uc l i i s ius anchor to r ea l i t y* Thmkin^ 
i s an a c t i v i t y which xeciuires ^anin^* ^rou i t s 
concern "jit"n wai ters hich &re of i r p i m f t J i^n i f i -
e n c e ,o ire# /hen 1 l^ave wys^li an1 ^y deepest 
concerns out of Lt, I sever i t s connections with 
ooj^ctive rea l i t* • Tn de- l inkin^ thought frow the 
e^o, I a lso snuo i t s GIPS ^ i tn the otho- b^cai^se I 
and iy concerns are che bridge, the very foundation 
of ny access co che oth^r . Thoarht divested of 
t'*e human nimifica.nce thus becomes an ox°rci°e in 
f u t i l i t y • In Fi^r1 o^aardian terminology, thought 
loses i j s ^ ' i 1 ten r i a l import* This Is tha v n l i c i t 
thene in J l ior '^^aar^ ' s notion of sub jec t iv i ty jsd 
f a i t h . 
fp^ p Y TJ na t r r ° an^ ^ur^oie o f thought, t^eo , 
i s to function as an auxi l iary to e x i s t e n c e . I t i s 
thus thac the t a s v o4" beoo iinsr subjective i s an 
en^rossin^ conceraTwith flthe simple t h i o l s of ^ i f e l f | 
i t l fis the task of l i v i n g " . Kierkegaard i l l u o crates 
t h i s notion by four a^oects of «xi°tc ice which have 
been so drained of the i r s ignif icance by non-exipxen-
t i " 1 ! thinking as to be reduced to oo moir laces; 
narieiy, Horr i^e* death, inroortali ty and God-
5 
relationship. On a superficial scrutiny, it nay 
3 O.TuP#, p. 116, 
4 Ibid, p* 146. 
5 Ib id , Part 11 , Chanter I . 
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se^ in that th^se four subjects fall into two categories 
according to the nature of the enauiry chat they 
invite* it would se^iii that thought has different 
obj^clives when it is confronted with the two types 
of questions. The ou^stion of narriage tnnlies the 
possibility of action and therefore donands a decision* 
It calls for a kind of thinkirr19 which is intended to 
help one act* Co nonsense would tell us that if we 
pursue the natter assiduously, wei^h the pro i and 
cons of c\e ^robl^n carefully, we ma^ eventually 
decide whether or not to marry* But death, i ">ii or-
tali uy and God, on the other hand, fall into another 
category. Here thought cannot even purport to lead 
to action w?hich will nodify the event or object• 
Mone of these cate^ori^s call for a decision* Whether 
or not one thinks ahouo it, one mist die. Death and 
its correlate immortality lie beyond the nal<* of 
human volition. Death is an inexorable, inscrutable 
event which overtakes every man sooner or later* 
Thought has not succeeded in unravelling its mysteries 
nor in stalling its advent* When 1 ponder over death 
in chis m^Yin^r9 1 do so to wonder at it, 1 think 
about it in a spirit of "aesthetic contenttation11, 
Kiereke^aard would say. 1 do not believe that thinking 
will rialee no immortal. Whether or not one thinks about 
it, one must die# Such is objective thinking. 
10 
And sinil ^ rly the question of God in obj active 
thought. Whether or not one believes in Hip, or 
even things about the jr-tter, God "-ay or may not 
exist. Tf God exists he exists irrespective or my 
belief to the contrary; if he do°s not, o^ will not 
sprioT iwo Loin^ because 1 believe in him. In any 
case I shall never >»o f enough to decide whether 
God exists or * heth^r 1 an ifinortal. Kierkegaard 
agrees on this I st joint but does not on tK/b 
account advocate cn^ abandoning of tb* qursbion. The 
inaccessibility of these oroblens to thought posits, 
in \ is vioT', n alternative which fomsthe oasis of 
his category of subjectivity and its correlate
 f 
faith* The notion of subjectivity in face obviates 
the ^eoninrf diversity of uh* t'?o types of questions 
by re-defining the nature and role of ieeision. ill 
aecisions are alike in being deeds aid are grounded 
6 in the "strenuosity11 of faith, as we shall see* 
Subjectivity in its essence is a shifting of the 
locus of A ^ nificance ^rom the malm of the external 
to th^ inward. Ix is a r^ v rsal of che focus of 
enquiry fro i conceots to the subject who conceives. 
When the sii^e m i chinks about death i is concern 
is not T'ith uhe abstraction, the event doadch, but 
with his o n dyni7* Death for him is not a generality 
6 C.U.P., p. 188. 
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but che radio-1 nnc rbainuy of his own exiau^nce. 
f l
# # # # i c J-S inrosa ib le uo understand t h i s 
uncer ta inty in z ^rm& of a riere genera l i ty 
unless indeed I , too , banp^n to be n« ely 
a hurian neing in general.11 7 
TYhcn 1 a s v f wAri 1 intaortal or do 1 Vcoiie 
immortal", uhe purport of uhe enouiry i s ; Do ^ 1 
become i I ior^al, I , a f i m t e en t i t y of a 1Ptor noa te 
and in a o-rxain s tvso , def in i t ive bi^corv. Reason 
er rs uost r ad ica l ly on t h i s quest ion. I t i s concerned 
as a l 7a; H „H N t a oDJect ratnor ^ ^ the ubpect. 
But in i t concern for objec t iv i ty reaaon faidr to 
see tha t u r" object of enquiry i s the suoj^ct 
hiraelf# rhon 1 ask t h i s question ny pr i^arv concern 
i s not wiih thn concept tfi iraortality11. Indeed I 
do not se^ immortality as a concent, as an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
xdea# !fhen 1 firs«, Jose i t , "In^iorbal i ty t ! to me 
s ign i f i e s an c>no aLed^enent of my innermost r e a l i t v 
as an experiencing individual and the ^ish and the 
hoie t V b xhi^ exi *ttn^ se l f would be o r >ebunted. 
But thought, in iuS heady i ro^ress , tends to overlook 
t h i s f a c t . I t i i ant co confuse t h i s nutation with 
another; ,/h»b i r i mor ta l i ty , and to launch in to an 
adventure of snecu1 t ion w>iich converts -^v^t beams 
as a -natter of fondest "°rsonal concern in to a 
universal idea, a mre creation of the speculat ive 
12 
faculty. In bhe ensuing "ceaseless parade of the 
Idea throught its course of thesis, antithesis and 
8 
synthesis", the flf recedes into the background 
and is lost. It is forgotten that the question has 
significance only in the fact that 1, the enquirer, 
exist and am finite. The key issues of philosophy, 
according to Kant, are freedom, immortality and the 
existence of God* Kierkegaard achieves a second 
Gop^rnican revolution in the realm of philosophy 
by reinstating the flf through the notion of 
subjectivity, a^w"' in doing so, reverts attention 
to these problems which are of central concern to the 
existing individual. Indeed he goes further and 
defines existence itself in terms of these concerns. 
At the beginning of the second part of the 
Postscript Kierk°a*aa,rd writes: 
"Objectively vie consider only the matter at 
issue, subjectively we have regard to the 
subject and his subjectivity; and behold, 
precisely this subjectivity is the natter 
at issue. Tfiis' must constantly be borne 
in wind, namely, that the subjective pro-
blem is lot something about an objective 
issue but is the subjectivity itself• Por 
since the problem in question poses a. 
decision, and since all decisiveness, .*## 
inheres in subjectivity, it is essential 
that every trace of an objective issue 
should be eliminated." 9 
8 Soren Kierkegaard, Stages on lifefs Way, Tr. 
Walter Lowrie, (NevTTo^ 1967* 
1969), p. vi. 
9 C.U.P., p* 116, 
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The s u b j e c t , tMio, i^ the "suoj cxive e x i a t i n ^ 
1 t h i n k e r " \ ho xs " i ^ f in i t e l ; / 1 i n t e r e s t e d i^ e x i s t i n g " • 
But e x i ^ t ^ i c e in in ui ^ ana t/m e ^ i ^ o l ^ i fli-vM-* a l 
aua e x i a t i n f T i nd iv idua l i s cons t an t ly in . r e j rocess 
11 
of hecTmins:. r^n^ ce no rc - l i t v <. f ex i bonce sre en ,3 
before the A i t t i n x i t f l i v i d r a l the f a c t o£ P t u r i ^ y 
.nd t o " 1 ,cv~ P x be rfc in ~^wioi , ) r - a i oeeaune 
1? 
thA i n d i v i d u a l e x i r co. Put ac t i on imnli^a dec i s ion 
an^ dec Lsion in i/nrn u t be n ec^dei by "io Tledrre# 
How i s o * exi^xinr/ i n d i v i d u a l to apprehend the 
t r u t h ? r i ^ r k e ^ ' o *d con r ide r s the c r a d i i i c i a l a^s t r ers 
15 
of r o a l i n an^ U e ^ l i s n . Both a re i iolioi;r™ based 
on „he n ^"n {e h a t b o i i y i s complete rpid ^ l ^ i s h e l . 
Por onl1, in. snob a ca ^ i s uhe correspondence oT 
^ o a l i t y and tbm bt or t ^ e conformi ty of r ^ a i i c y uo 
bhonr^T p o s s i b l e . The two t h e o r i e s com l i t a dot a le 
a b s t r a c t i o n - Che s n b j ^ c t and the o V e c t are a b s t r a c t 
- e f i Cbioi 4 of the ^ ' m s t i n 1 k ^ower
 c n 1 ix*n en ) i r i c a l 
O3jocu. T l is uLbin xo ty in t h i s o h a i t o i a r i d , t r u t h 
i s an i d e n t i t y of though c and being because the two 
terms wean one ?n6 t he same thin**, aid t* o t h e o r i e s 
14 
red ice xo an c s s e r t i o n iha t t r u t h i s . But , 
fta,n e x i a t i i r i n d i v i d u a l i s c o n s t a n t l y l i 
p rocess of iecoirin*r; the iotu 1 e x i o t i n ^ 
s u b j e c t i v e t h i n k e r c o n s t a n t l y reproduces 
10 G.LT.»%», p . 2 6 8 . 
11 I b i d . , X). 172 . 
12 I b i d », p * d [ 1 ® 
13 I b i d . , D . 170. 
14 TTDXCF., IO. 169 - 1 7 2 . 
14 
this existential situation in his thought 
and translates all his nhin^ing in tens 
of process•" 15 
This fact LncroTu^es into the knowledge stiuation 
the uncertainty inhere it in be coining. By the very 
fact that the knoTier exists and enquires, the 
dichotomy of subjecc and object is re-introduce^. 
The categories of thourht and bein^ are once a^ain 
seo'rat^ becaa* e uje existing subject exisja in 
16 time* This a^ain oxxns up two alternative points 
of view; the objective and the subjective, J»e 'What1 
and the fHo\ f * Pro?] the objective standpoint, the 
subject and hia interests are of no import; cbe 
sub loot's concerns raua t indeed be eliminated fro^ 
the enquiry Tor it in in bMs that objective validity 
consists• "^ ut if I a.a thus objective, how7 HQ 1 act? 
Per as an existing individual 1 rount act and auction 
pre-supposes pupaose and interest. And it is pre-
cisely this Aien^nt that objective reflection 
eli! inatos. 
Si'.ce the oroble i Is posed by existence, we 
nust turn to ex^erieice xo comprehend it. *fe noted 
that the primary character of thought is to further 
the individual's interests. 7hen 1 nonpar over 
natters of existeitxal im )ort to n*, reason reveals 
15 GJi.P., r>. 79* 
16 Ibid., p* 171• 
15 
to n^ the uitu«*» of the a l t ^ r »atives the nrobl^n 
D e m i t s . 3ut Lt cannot reveal the s i ^ n i f i c nee the 
proj«ct°d a^Gion has for me, for t h i s i s ioi^uhinT 
1 myself contr ibute as an exv*tm<* ind iv idua l . And 
i t i s t h i s reaidnuw ofc6 in te res t inaccess ib le to 
reason hich i i uhe decisive faccor in .y decis ion. 
ky i n t e r e s t i s thus the starti^iff-point and the erd^ 
point in though
 u# i t i s t h i s "fact to which T'ierke<*aard 
noincs when *e wrices l^at " a l l i n t e r e s t , l ike a l l 
17 decis iveness , i s roouecl in subj^ctivity f l# 
Purch^r lore, ob jec t iv i ty p r se i s also 
def ic ient in anochpr \ af> ; i t cannot be acmeved by 
one e x i t ing individual* As an ex i s t ing individual 
in th* "rocedes o bcuJdin^, confronted with the 
"unfinished e^p i r io r l object'1 , tA IUSI contend r?ibh 
the rad ica l uncer ta inty of the o x t T n a l 'or ld . In 
the world of b coain^ t fie re nay yet be a conformity 
of thought and objpct but chis belongs only- to the 
1R 
omniscience and efe mal i ty of God. On the f in iue 
indiv idual , exisuancc iwaos^s a douala continue icy; 
th t of the excernal * arid and ul e p o s s i b i l i t y of 
his o*yn death. Kierkegaard wr i t e s : 
flThus constant ly in process of beconin? i s 
the eluriven^sn „hat >*rbains to th^ i ) f in i te 
17 0.1UP,9 p . 173. 
18 Ib id , p . 170* 
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in e x i - t N n c e . I t i s enough to b r i n ^ a 
sensuous man co d e s u a i r , f o r one always 
fe^lo a need to have nonething finished 
and conplete; .... The incessant b^conin? 
generates the uncertaincy of the earthly 
life, where everything is uncertain. 
Bvery kiinun oeing knows this, and at times 
gives it expression, expecially on sol^ ion 
occasions, and t^en not without tears and 
perspiration.ff 19 
Thus, for the existing individual, objective know-
20 ledge c-n onljr oe an approximation and hypothesis. 
The conclusion that naturally follows is that 
^if only sou ace of certainty is my own subjectivity. 
Therefore uhe anfoit of ny knot?ledr is liwited oj ly 
o™n existence because it centres upon it. But this 
is not a deficit my for it only point to and confirms 
the basic fact chat thought has signific nee for me 
only in so far as it furthers ny own existence. 
Kierke^aar0 wri tec s 
"All essential knowledge relates to existence, 
or only such vnox/ledge as has relationship to 
existence is essential knowledge. All know-
ledge which does not inwardly relate itself 
to existence, in the reflection of inwardness, 
is essentially viewed, accidental knowledge; 
its degree and scope is essentially indifferent* 
That essential knowledge is essentially related 
to existence does not nean the above-nentioned 
identity which abstract thought postulates 
between thought and being; nor does it signify, 
objectively, that knowledge corresponds to 
something existent as its object. But it 
neans what knowledge has a relationship to the 
Lnower, Tko is essentially an exisLiig individual 
and for this reason all essential kno^ ledsre is 
19 0.U..P., p. 79* 
20 Ibid, p# 173. 
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essentially related to existence. Only 
ethical an * etbico-religious kno\ ledge has 
an essential relationship to the existence 
of the kno iFer.ft 21 
I ^ v r r t h e T e s s , xrn th i s i d e n t i t y of thought and 
being* The no t ion of t r u t h as i d e n t i t y of thought and 
being poses a pribioaj no t hecauao i t i s in i t s e l f 
f a l s e out because i t i s u n r e a l i z a b l e f o r the e x i s t i n g 
?? ifldivi "km! by v i r t u e of trie f a c t t h a t he e x i s t s . ~ 
The problem i s t h a t s^ch i d e n t i t y i s not p o s s i b l e fo r 
him in the f i^xxudc irmosed by h i s t e i p o r a l i t v , and 
when thought s e t s out to acbi*ve such u n i t y i t 
inevicabLy l e a v e s the e x i s t i n g i n d i v i d u a l behind and 
w r e s t l e s with a ph n ton . 
In order t o r e a l i s e c u i p l ^ t e c e r t a i n t y , t h e r e f o r e , 
the i n d i v i d u a l PUSG t r anscend h i s ^ a n t ^ c e . And the 
only moi'TcS T,Then n a ach ieves t h i s ar^ r/hen V* i s 
23 
"ou t s ide himself11 in oass ion . J The locus of t r u t h 
thus oni to frow che 0 3 fpct t o the s u b n e t ' s ro la , t ion~ 
sb in to i t . ^ I ca^ nev~r "now fo r c e r t a i n 'beuber ^n 
obj c t i s roa ' . or noc , but i f iy i n t e r at i n i t i s 
t r u l y i n t e n s e a id p a s s i o n a t e , 1 am in ihe t r u t h # The 
^uaranba^ of t m e b does not l i e in L^e o a j r e t ; i f 
t h i s TFera ~o, : r i xh ould fo r eve r be i n a c c e s s i b l e xo 
aie• The Guarantee l i e s in uhe f a c t t h a t I r e l a t e 
to i t with nasaionabe i n t e n s i t y ; 1 b e l i e v e in i t . "Phe 
21 0 . T i . ? . , T). 177 . 
22 THTT °* n ^ . 
23 TBTr^ p^ 176. 
24 Ibid . , "o, 178, 
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answer, then, lies in ny inwardness, fttaat lonely 
ollanri i" in which u%ie Deity dwells m the profound 
25 
stillness where everything is silenc". This 
inwardness is the "o^rce of decision* 
lu i s in t h i s not ion t1 a t thp s o e i i i ^ l p d i v e r s e 
exaiinles I auot^d a.x the b e d i m i n g of t i?is s e c t i o n 
r ece ive t h ^ i r un i ty* d a m a g e bes t i l l u s t r a t e s the 
e x m b e n c i a l predicament fo r i t b r ings to the fo re che 
pro ale * of r c f l c t i on v i s - a - v i s f a i t h * ' rarriap*a 
Tnilo4; p e tbp ouucoie of r e s o l u t i o n f o r wi thout x>^at 
i t ^ould be no nore hht n an impulsive ac tLon. But 
r e^ l ecu ion b r n *o one the u n c e r t a i n t y read i t v n u s t 
a l ays u r r s e ^ , rere as no diere e l s e onQ i s f ced 
with the moonc iu i v e ^ s s of ar^um n rs oro and c e n t r a . 
I d e a l l y T should peladi the reasons in favour of 
i s r r i a r e aga . in r t those which oppose i t and then decide* 
Kierkegaard " n o e s in Scales,. on. h i f e ^ s yay : 
"But t o n e r r y i s t o enoer jnuo a f a c t u a l 
sibu^wion in r e l a t i o n s h i p to a give?"1 r e a l i t y : 
p c r r l a ^ e i s t b e nos t e x t r a o r l i n a r y concre t ion* 
This concre t ion c o n s t i t u t e s the te.sk of 
r e f l e c t i o n . But nay be i t i s so concre te . . . 
t ha t no r e f l e c t i o n can p i e r c e through i t ? 
In case t h i s is assumed, one h^s the reby 
assumed a t t he sane t i ^ t h ^ t no r e s o l u t i o n 
Ccn »ver be reached. A r e s o l u t i o n , however, 
i s an i lea Ir uy# 1 h ve the r s o l u t i o n before 
1 b e g i i t o cci in v i r t u e of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n . 
But ho * then c«o 1 ge t t h i s r e s o l u t i o n ? A 
r e s o l u t i o n i s alh-a^a r e f l e c t i v e : i f one does 
r o t give heed t o t h i s , language becomes 
confused, tne r e s o l u t i o n i s xden t i *iod wi th 
25 O . P ^ . o * 163. 
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an imediate imnulse •••.. In a "ouroly 
ideal reflection then resolution has ideally 
exhausted reality, and the conclusion of 
this ideal reflection is southing more than 
a
 .sranya stulaarua, in short it is precisely 
resolution; resolution is the idealit:r brought 
about by a purely ideal reflection, it is the 
earned c .pital required for action.11 26 
In other ^ords, uhe aesthetic ideality of reflection 
v/h ere in b h e i d e al i uy is the possible, CU1PI± n at e s in 
the ethical ideality of resolution which is an 
expression of the individuals reality, his inv/ardness. 
The ideality of reflection is translated into the 
resolution to marry by the passion of love which is 
the driven of the situation* "....without pas-ion one 
97 
never brills reflection to conclusion.11"' Decision 
is therefore a leap, an affirmation of a ledge of 
possibility reason does not bridge. This possibility 
is the individual's reality conceived by hiwself 
in thought. But the certainty which inheres in the 
individual's passloi, which is the expression of the 
reality t!*at is his inwardness, does not yet efface 
the aossibility that the external reality/ may not be 
conducive to his interests* Despite the certitude 
of his passion, the world is co him an unascertainable 
entity. In the face of this uncertainty, he t^ ust 
either renounce his love or accent che uncertainly 
with the courage born of faith in the benevolence and 
26 Stages, p. 158* 
27 IbidM P. 160. 
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onniDOcence of G-od. Thus, decision is an act of 
28 faith, na religious starting point" for the 
uncertainty presented by the future is such that 
"he nust either l~t go of love....or believe in 
God."0 
Pasoion , a g a i n , i s toe d e c i s i v e e le ?ont in 
&od-rela i i o n s h i p . v/ben the i n d i v i d u a l r e a l i r e s bhQ 
pa infu l fuzi Li ry of the ob j ec t i ve search f o r G-od, 
in t h a t ijowent he has r e a l i z e d God fo r he has 
embraced h i a in f a i t h . I ! l t i s then nox so nueh th ru 
God Is a p o s t u l a t e , as t h a t the e x i s t i n g i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
30 
_os tu l r , t ion of God i s a necess i ty . 1 1 And i r m o r t a l i t y 
i s a s i i a i l a r n e c e s s i t y * To ctxeixi^t t o f ind 
o b j e c t i v e proofs 'or xrnnorxality i s absurd and 
f u t i l e , ihe i n d i v i i u l f s consciousness of i m o r t a l i t y 
i s i t s oT?n ,roof. f , l ^or ta l ioy i * ^)e lost p a s s i o n a t e 
i n t e r e s t of s u b j e c t i v i t y ; p r e c i s e l y in cbo i n t e r e s t 
31 l i e s the n r c H V 1 "Buo in order fo r the Question t o 
e x i s t the i nd iv idua l auat become s u b j e c t i v e . I t i s 
only in uhe r c T ^ s iiv" inwardness of sif j ~ c t i v i b y 
t h a t uhe a u ^ u i o n can ne -nos^c1 "or i t i s ulpre ohat 
its source lies. 
23 S t a g e s , p . 159* 
29 I b i d , p . 160, 
30 0 . ] i . P . , p . I79. 
31 lhU% u. 1h5. 
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The c'euemin ^ *f truth, t^us, is not the 
objective content; hut the subjective wode of 
appr '^ '^ nsion. rnruth lies in uhe passionate inward 
affirmation of subjectivity and this inwardness 
consists in a T>royrfp tion. The truth of what I say 
is not jud^d by bbe '7babf of it but by ay o m rela-
tionship to it. If 1 have a uxropri ted the idea so 
that ny whole existence is an expression a.nd 
affirm :ion of i., I attest to its truth o ihe v*ry 
fact :h t 1 «::i3c. rflhis infinite nanr ion of inwardness 
is ita orn content and its juotxfxexli on dips not 
32 lie beyond itself. Subjectivity is truth." 
But t^ e certainty engendered by the infinitude 
of nasoion rnusl hs r^eserved an* renewed by striving. 
The Boaeix of "ociexon lies in oas. ion but this 
low^ntary coixact with the infinite "hen translated 
in terns of exintenoo in tin^ results in striving. 
Decisiveness lies in passion but it ust be realised 
in existence throuxh effort* 
In t^rns of suDjoctxvxty, tr^th is aubj^ctivit^ 
or inr,ardn°s • B^t ohj^etivel r, in t°rjs of reason, 
truth is a n radox, :^ ° eternal •manifesting itself 
ii axicte^oe* Tuat is, the fact t at wnat is eternal 
shouV"' be ,»resenD xo an e x i s t i n g Lnl iv id^c l l a p a r a -
doxical; truth, however, itself is not paradoxical* ^  
32 G.V.~\9 n. 181* 
33 Ibid, n. 183. 
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This is the key factor in the knowledge situation 
which escanes the attention of rationalists and 
idealists. Both agree that "truch is11 but fa.il to 
notice the contradiction inherent in the fact, and 
the inescapable in !eber-»inacy that it must thus 
present. Therefore the definition of truth as 
subjectivity nust have as its corollary a parallel 
definition of truth in terms of reason as "objective 
uncertainty"; and a complete definition of truth, 
"a conceptual determination of the truth", mist 
combine the two aspects and emphasize the antithesis. 
Thus Kierkegaard arrives at the definition? "An 
objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-
process of the woat oassion te inwardness is the 
truth.11*'1" Kierkegaard calls this definition !la 
memento of the fork in the road where xhe way 
35 
swings off." The objective uncertainty and 
inwardness are directly related; the ^r^ater the 
uncertainty, the greater the passion of inward 
appropriation that it evokes. There is thus a 
dialectical tension between the two categories* The 
more uncertain a certain existential sbiuation is in 
terms of reason, the more intensely must 1 believe 
in it for ixs truth is of interest to ne. One must 
34 OJJJP., p. 182. 
35 Ibid, p. 182. 
once again bring to -»ind the key distinction between 
the existential postulate and xhe concepts of pure 
reason. ITy immortality and a mathematical proposition 
do not stand in the same relation to me; 1 ara 
intensely interested in the truth of the one and 
am indifferent, as a subjective existing thinker, to 
the truth of xho other. In the realm of the existen-
tial it is imperative to me that what cannot be 
comprehended by reason be grasoed by faith* Indeed 
1 must believe precisely because reason cannot grapple 
with it. Thus it is that, "the above definition of 
36 truth in an equivalent expression for faith11. faith 
is the eziating individual's answer to the risk that 
the uncertainty revealed by thought presents. 3y 
reasoning 1 cannou decide; herce 1 must decide. Thought 
can only present possibilities; decision can be 
provided only by the immediate certainty that 
resides in the individual's beliefs. nevertheless, 
there is tho risk that external reality presents. It 
may not correspond, to my belief. The coherence of 
thought and being is credible only to the speculative 
nhilosooher. The existing individual must forever 
contend rnth in xcarnality which may or may not 
relate oositively to bis decisions. Hence the 
necessity of faith, 'Pbc dialectical tension between 
36 O.IT.P., p. 182. 
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the objective un.certa.inty and subjective passion is 
such that faith preserves and renews itself by 
grasping the uncertainty. It is precisely the risk 
that necessitate:} faith; where there is no risk, 
there is objective knowledge and hence no need of 
faith. Once again. Kierkegaard illustrates this 
notion by referring to belief in Gods "If 1 am 
capable of grasping God objectively 1 do not believe, 
but precisely because 1 cannot do this 1 must 
believe." 
The underlying theme of the preceding is the 
Kierkegaard!an distinction between the 'ethical' and 
the 'aesthetic'. The ethical pertains to existence 
and therefore to action* It concerns the individual 
in existence and thus emphasizes the need for 
decision as opposed to mere contemplation. The ethical 
is thought yoked to reality, the actuality of the 
individual's exiaten.ee,and its task, therefore, is 
to be decisive. To ~revert to the examples cited at 
the beginnings marriage is perhaps the most crucial 
decision in an individual's life because "to marry 
in to enter intc. a factual situation In relationship 
to a given reality; Harria,xe is the wost extraordinary 
38 
concretion." The reality is given; therefore it 
37 0:.U.P#, p. 182. 
38 .Stages, p. 157. 
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cannot b"» e d i f i e d >y n e . ITor*over, i t i s r iven but 
not keo^n. Hence t i e d e c i s i v e r o l ° of ec sa ion . But 
the e r i s t i c i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e c i s i o n s a re i m n o r t a i t 
only because of b i s OT n b e l i e f xn h i s c o n u i i u i t y 
'itv«out which h i s a c t i o n s , and t h e r e f o r e h i s d e c i s i o n s , 
wi l l have no A ^ n i f i c ^ n c e . This b e l i e f in e o n t i n u i t y 
i s i m o r t a l i t y . Fierke^xaard w r i t e s ; " for e t h i c a l l y 
every tn i» cu l vin t ^ s i i inmoxtaLi ty; wi thout x h ich 
39 the ech ic 1 l a u-^ralv i se and wont;*11 And un i e r -
lyino* i l r> o i s f a i t h in God. 7or ,he f fr jaitv . . . i s 
precenx ao soon as t 1 ^ u n c e r t a i i t y or a l l ; b i»^ j i s 
thought i n f i n i t e ! 7 " . "Por t h i s reason one jlro r e a l l y 
has an <* -e ""or the Ooitv can see him e v o r y v i e r e . " 
Fa i th thus c o n o l e r o t s r ^ f l e c c i o n . l e f L e c t i o n 
r e v e a l s tae p o s s i b i l i t i e s but f ^ i t h e f f e c t s the 
choice * jd t 'u is a c t u a l i z e s the e o s a i b i l i o y # The 
faccor of "^cis ion i nhe re s in the e x i s t i n g i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
i a s s ion which i s h i s °oeess t o e t e r n a l t r u t h . Ref lec t ion 
does not b r idge ^he dx,c caice netween the "oos&ib"1^ and 
the p c t u f l . from r e f l e c t i o n t o dec i s ion i s eot a 
g radua l t r a n s i t i o n . I t i s ° l eap from the known 
ooss ib le to the unknown a c t u a l f n a i e on the atren^xh 
of f a i t h . This i s uhe r o l e of f a i t h in ^ realm of 
the ' e t b i c a l ' accord ing to F ierke^aard* And t h i s f a r t b 
e n t a i l s s t r i v i n g . 
39 G.V.I . , D. 1 % , 
40 I b i d , P . 8 0 . 
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But uii re is anoth r Vind of faith which is a 
leap not from reason to cercainby but a le i > against 
reason* This is ib* faith of h^e ral igioua or para*-
doxical-reli^ious. In fact, Fierkegaard reaerves the 
use of the e-:eression "the leap" exc1usiv°ly for faith 
in this concext, in the Postscript;, after che fashion 
of Lessin-% The aatam in the sphere of uhe o^radoxical-
reli^iou° is the fa^t of Ohriot; that God was born 
4-1 in the fLesn as man. If the accessibility of 
eternal truth to an exxatin^ individual is a "paradox", 
viewed reflectively, the eternal coming i to being 
in time is "absurd11. mne paradox differs from the 
abaur f in its re I action to reason. Reason acceots that 
11
 cruth is"; xo do so is iot contrary to reason. The 
paradoxiclity is only its availability to the existing 
individual despice the fact that objectivelv there is 
an uncertainty. But regarding the incarnation there 
is no objective uncertainty: reason is certain of 
what it is eonfron"ew ^itb and its verdict on it is 
that it is absurd. This is th^ only way in *h Ich 
reason c n aop ehend it or when it tri£s to e x'xLain 
it, it inevitably alters the subject and ^nds by 
positing something ifhich is essentially different 
from thac mxtb ^hich it started* Season may attempt 
41 C.U.I., p. 188. 
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t o d e p r duo the pacc of Chr i s t as an h i s t o r i c a l 
event but when i t does so i t misses th/* e s s e n t i a l 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n nrhich belongs to the e v e n t , namely, 
tha t th ^t which i s e t e r n a l nas come i n t o e x i s t e n c e 
in time* I t can *et out on such a ven tu re only by 
assuming t h a t such an event i s p o s a i o l ^ f which i s 
a b s u r l . T oreov-^r, if i t proves t h u t h e e^ent i s 
c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l l y , what i t proves i s not t h a t 
A O 
a?hich i t s car ted out GO /rove.1"" In t h i s TTay what 
43 
reason -chieves i s a c o r r e c t i o n not an explanacion 
for i t has supplanted the cace^ory of the absurd by 
a n o t h e r . The term oaradox i s thus reduced t o a. 
" r h e t o r i c a l e x p r e s s i o n " . ' 
Al l avenues of r a u i o c i ^ n t i o n a re t l u s e f T e c t i v e l y 
sea led and the ex i su ing i n d i v i d u a l i s l e f t wi th the 
q u e s t i o n ; Bo 1 or do 1 not b e l i e v e . The only mode 
of ^ p r e h e n s i o n permitted by the ADSUXTI i s f a i t h 
f o r "^ y i s very a uiiae i t puts i t s e l f beyond the pale 
of n e" son . Reason "call only heighten ins P ^apox ica l 
n a c u r e . Tne P r «do\ met be affirmed by a,n c t of 
45 f a i t h and "held f a s t wibh the pass ion of i nwardness" . 
The r i s k i i ho renn in
 C J 1 1 b e l i e f i s enlarre^1 immeasurably 
42 C . U . r , , v. 190. 
^3 i o i d , n* 136* 
44 TfrHf, p . 1 7 . 
45 M L ^ P- 2°CJ-
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in this eminent act of faith for what is at stake 
is the individual's eternal happiness. The uncertainty 
therefore intensifies the voluntary act of affirmation. 
Kierkegaard writes: 
"The Socratic ignorance is as a witty jest 
in comparison with the earnestness of facing 
the Absurd; pnd the Socratic existential 
inwardness is as Greek light-mindedness in 
comparison with the grave strenuosity of 
faith." 46 
What are the determinations of faith? How 
does it express itself? In Fear and Trembling Kierke-
gaard illustrates the dialectic of faith through the 
story of Abraham. In Abraham are exemplified the 
two movements of faith - the readiness to give up the 
finite on the altar of faith and to regain, it in joy 
in the belief --hat for God all things are possible. 
Both the movements are leaps for they are not achieved 
through gradual transition but through a. decisive act 
of the will in the face of the Absurd. Faith is thus 
LI 
a "double-iiiovement^leap11. ' f It is also the absurd 
for it puts the individual in an absolute relationship 
to God over against the universal or the ethical* The 
demands of Abraham's faith were such that he trans-' 
cended the ethical dictum - Thou shalt not kill - in 
obedience to a higher command - Thou shalt obey. The 
46 CJJ.P.p, 138. 
47 David L. Goicoecbea, Doctoral Thesis. 
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modi t i n" universal i s t^us nu l l i f i ed an * faiuh 
becomes a 1-^ ap hieh ruts ^he p a r u ^ l ^ r in to a 
d i rec t r^Vmionrfan xo the i b s o l a t ° . in"1 in chis l i « s 
uhe iread of f p r n * uhny to i t iu^t be s^criTiced 
the nniversa1 ^a^ ch r l^ tes uhe i n h v v k i i to o t s r 
ind iv idua ls . rev-ru ^lesc , in che seeon " *ovmienb 
of the Leajf th-* / ° a 1 m ,,0 the f i n i t e , fre L g r n j ^ d 
re ams cha imiv^T 1 ihroupti a g i f t of God. Indeed 
his faiuh i i nou co ipl^te unc i ! he makes In 
rocond iove ion t and eez*ajn^ DO possess me f i n i t e 
in Joy in the bounty of God. i t i s thus tha t " r^i^^e 
becomes a dnt r - id a l ink xn the b e l i e v e r ' s 
God-relauionship. 
/e ^ave t us arrived *-t tf o n w r "ete An uions 
of f*ast^; fnxt^ as a cen^l^p^iit po reason T i- jein 
cruch emerges as chc su03 active inward aor»ronri< uion 
of m objective uncer ta in ty , and r e e o ^ l v , Qs the act 
of ^raspin an event reason cannot countenance. 
Kierkegaard c a l l s Z*n * former >ocratic fa i th in uhe 
Pos t sc r ip t f and the l e t t e r , Christian f a i t h . In 
1
 hiloso.,^iCr 1 Pra* Qnts he brings to^etn^r the two 
notions of ft-anh in bib theory of e r ro r , ^herein 
Chr is t ! n taiuh - diich he call-4 fa i tn in the f eminent 
sense - brings i s h s c o r o l l ' / y a n°w cat^^ory, ' s i n ' , 
which supersedes the docrat ic notion of forget fu lness . 
48 Soron Kiereke^a r^ , Philosophical ^ra^m^nbs, t r . 
David Swencon, (Prrnce^ 
Precs, 1°71» <th - r . ) , Cluster I . 
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Quite briefly, the argument is as follows* in the 
Socratic theory of s iowledge, the absence of truth 
is merely ignorance «or the individual has in him 
the et'r*v«l truili "hi ;b returns to hi 1 in c^e i%onn of 
recollection ohrouaii bhe maieutic nediaxion of the 
teacher. Thus thtt individual possesses in himself 
the condition or che capacity for the appi^ ehension of 
truth and toe moment of truth has no significance. 
Tt is one in an at^rnal succession for the individual 
becomes conscious tnat he possesses trach eternally. 
If the moment oT truth is to have significance 
the absence of truth must be not ignorance buo error* 
This would imply bhat the individual possessed the 
condition for the ap ^  *ehonsion of truth wnd forfeited 
ic through milt. Iilrror thus becomes sin. Further, 
wbile the iidividual Is free to lose zhe condition of 
truth in sin oy an act of the will, h° xs -*ot si rilarly 
free to regain if by imsel m the same ^ ay that the 
terms offered to a"knight before the combac are not 
automatically his once he is vanquished in battle and 
taken urison^r, buc can onl; be renewed at the Pleasure 
of his adversary. Thus, in the Christian context, the 
condition for the ap rehension of truth xxst be 
restored to the individual b the Teacher. This 
condition is faith. 
31 
On the p~^ rt of tae indivi^i al, faith constats in an 
ace of acceptance since uhe love of the Teacher for 
the learn r forbears from ta>xng a^ay bis freedom 
and asks i «at He be received freely in faLth. J 
levertl eless, faith is not an act of the ill for 
villii**- ir o' 10 ivai™^  without the condition of faith. 
Once the con1iwion is given, the truth is arprebended 
v • n 50 
by will ing* 
Tms 3 otiO/1 of fa i th as precondition i*or vhe 
apprehension of t ru th underl ies Kierkegaard^ ans er 
to our 1 s t question in bhia connection. T o^m i s 
Christ known? Tne answer i s contained in the notion 
of conie ifcjoraneity• \^ ediate contemporaneity can 
only he an occasion foe oellef in so far as f a i th 
i t s e l f L3 a c o p i t i o n tha t cm be ^ranted only by God. 
Thus the iwmeri/ ue contemporary has io advantage 
over the l ^ e r ' n c i a l e , who nusx also receive f a i th 
from ftod# h;ot7overf the i imeliau^ contemporary ^o 
i s a ho l i e r r c n X^roupb "is te Hi ion;/ o^rve as an 
occasion for the inu^r d i s c i p l e . "The a accessor 
beli ve^ 0} i^ o is of ( t h i s express°s the occasional) 
tae tesui io^y of the contemnorar/, nn$ xn / r r t1 a of 51 the c o i ' i t i o n ne hi -<*1 rece vas "rom G-od.11 
Bui in order xo be uhus meaningful, tn^ x a t i lony 
4? Fra~ °n l r f Chepoer I I . 
5 0
 Ibidt p . 77 - 78. 
51 Ib id , p . 131. 
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slioul ' regain the paradoxical nature of fa i th or i t 
T r i l l oe^en-rate muo uhe accoxmt of an historian or 
philosopher. To coic lu le : 
"On];/ out who receives the con^iuion from 
the (rod xs a soli over. (This corresponds 
exactly to the require ^n t that ^an mat 
renounce %is reason and on uhe oxh^r hood 
discloses t*i° only for1! of a ^thority ohat 
corresponds co faith.)11 52 
Kierkegaard "ievelops the motion of aathopity 
fi r ther in On ^ u u i p k l l x . ^ d
 : ^ w l a t ion. The f i a t of 
the thesir i s that an apostle i s one in whom i s vested 
a transcend-nt r ; abo i io / \ lie i s God's mesron^er, and 
herein l i " a the valic ' i t r of his message. I t ic* not to 
be scrutinized i^ ter^s of i t s content. To ^o so 
is hlnen^e- v» I t i s al°o an irrelevance To'4 a 
command i^ n i n ra GX re ub u pppt b> let ^nzh the 
response of obeUe^ce or disobedience and not Ttith 
che s p i r i t )C c r i t i c a l » :amin<*cion. Such an atcituoe 
i s s ropar tcwtrds the 'words of a renins buu is <m 
impertinence in ro 'a t ion to anostolie u t t^ra ce for 
the va l id i ty of the l a t t e r consists so le l^ in che fact 
that i t in conveyed oy divine ordinance. There i s 
thus a qualitacive difference between tb* genius and 
the a u o s f e . 
"Auti ar i t^ la a specific anal i ty ^hich comes 
from another place and aakeo i t se l n •*">"» t 
a r e o l a ~>]y *'hen the c o n t e n t of t h e s a y i n g o r 
of t h e a c t i o n i s n s s u a r d t o be i n d i f f e r e n t . 1 1 53 
52 Pra^ients , p# 129* 
53 ^orenwl^8rveyaaard , On Authority and Heyelauion, t r . 
Walter lowrie f (Princetons Prncecon University 
Press, 1955), ^ . 110. 
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The only appropriate response to authority is 
commitment in faith an I obedience or denial and 
disobedience. Kierkegaard writes: 
11
 An auoeeictie statement ... is what it is 
only by the fact that this er that Ban said 
it, a statement iiich does not at all demand 
to be understood or fathomed but only to be 
believed
 #
lf
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Hence che crucial importance of the Teacher over 
against hia doctrine. In the context of Christian 
faith, this importance rests upon the fact that the 
Teacher is the repository of authority "Author!by11, 
thus, !lis either an anoatolic call, or che specific 
55 
quality of ordination"• This authority is para-
doxical for it cannot be proved by reasoning. The 
apostlefs * ord is his sole proof. If the aaoscle could 
prove hi ^  call ouysioally, h^ would be MO apostle. 
This notion of authority also disposes of 
atte^ats to establish the validity of the Scriptures 
by critical scholarship. Kiercepaard writes: 
"People creat the Scriptures so scientifically 
thac they uxrhb quite as well by anonymous 
writings•" 56 
whereas, as Kierkegaard writes in another connection, 
flo**»this content exists only for Faith, in 
uhe same rovr *> that colours exist only for 
si/rht and sounds for hearing." 57 
54 On Authoriby and, Revelation, p. 115. 
55 Ibid, p. 111. 
56 Ibidf po 27• 
57 fragments* p. 128. 
OHAPTEH T7Q 
Reason 
Kierkegaard's fundamental position in regard 
to the role of reason -understood in the ordinary 
sense of reflection is as we sax/ It expressed in the 
Stages in connection with marriage* Reflection may 
reveal the aosnibiliti^s available to us but a 
decision munt snrin^ from the certitude of nassion. 
This fundamental assesbment of reason is carried 
over into the mainstream of his Philosophy the 
purpose and function of which is, as Kierkegaard 
writes, f,to discover where che misunderstand!^ 
lies between speculative philosophy and Christianity". 
To recapitulate. Reason exposes the >otentialiti 
of a situation* It may analyze the dimensions of a 
problem and reveal the possible courses of action 
omen to us but it cannot staGO «ith any decree of 
finality whether one of these alternatives will 
lead bo the desired ^oal. Certainty resides in the 
individuals oassionate interest in the ^oal itself. 
This passion and the inwardness from which it srrinfs 
are indeed the only certainty available to man. 
Decision is thus an act of faith, a leap in the face 
of the uncertainty the external world oresents from 
1 C.U.P., p. 216. 
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the springboard of the certainty of inwardness. This 
is faith in the realm of the practical and the ethical. 
from this basic standpoint follows the notion of 
subjective truth. Truth is accessible uo ^isn but not 
through his rcmxnon. Reason always an ro?:i iattas but 
never achieves ceruainty. Truth is by definition 
that which is certain and certainty is possible for 
•~an only in his inwardness. Truth is therefore 
inwardness and. in^ardnesa expresses itself as faith 
in the lace of objective uncertaintv. Tru :h is ubus 
faith. 
Correspond! >r to idia two ^ete minations of 
fait1'1 referred zo in chanter one ch^ r*e are two 
asnects to truth in as mch as oruxh and faith are 
equivalent expression";. The Socratic xrux1 is 
a ,P3*ehended by Willi i^  but the Christian jrubh must 
2 
ne given. ,^VB uhe absence of Gixith is Cor~otfalness, 
truth cones into heir*? -*>on the individual wills to re-
call it with the guidance of the teacher# But when 
ignorance is replaced by error and error is defined 
as wilful neooxence brought about by Tuilb, truth 
beeoues a, rift of yrace. Thus we arrive at the 
r>re ixse thxe; outside of faith truth is Inconceivable. 
In obhpr words, faith implies sceuticism. The basic 
2 Frac:jonts, p. 21. 
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distrust; of reason x^at the analysis of the process 
of decision evokes culminates in a denial of rea,son 
as the sole orran of brush. Startin" fron fae Precise 
thai reason does not procure certainty it xs r;bown 
that io cannot do no beceur« cruth bv its very 
nature is beyon its purview. Truth lies in uhe 
realm of P"ith. 
Uev^rth^less, reason oersints in its acripnai^ 
to know the unknown for it is its nature to do ao# 
With pasaiofiaua inu^isLt^ it seeks to ami) 'e^ i^cl 
soicGhiny Ibi t awat always be beyond i cs reach for 
it is unlike it. Tbis in t^e iaradox of reason* It 
reaches cova^drj an unknown ttax li^s beyon'1 its 
limits. This unknown is God. 
jjoir r]0oS vea3on copport itself towards God? 
Hi e ri e ^aam *d con a i d e vs this qu ^  s t i on by an al;y si n ^  
the classic 1 proofs for Godfs existence. All 
racionalistic proofs for Godfs existence are futile 
for if God does not exiatf his existence cannot be 
proved for DO do so is to prove chat soiothinac that 
does not exi^t exists, which ±B impossible. On the 
other hand, if God ejri^ts, ii is superfluous Lo 
orove tVx ha oes. Indeed &j^y att^m't to prove 
the existence of T-od must oe<un with the assumption 
5 Praxrien i^s, P# 49* 
4 Ibidt p* 49. 
37 
tha t he e x i s t s . nhus ^roofs for the exiatance of 
God can only ne attempts at proving tha t something 
t1 ex eziisos is God. ^ut to proceed uO deduce from 
existence tha t t ^ ° t t ' ich ex i s t s i s a p a r t i c u l a r 
c o^ lebhio^ i s d i f f i c u l t for th^re i s 30 necessary 
connection bet Teen d^eda and the door in the realm 
of the uc rxicnl a% Unless we be^in "y assuming fne 
e x n t s i c e of ilaiolaon and that cer ta in act ions ^rere 
actua!3v h i s , we ocn lever conclude from these 
acuio^s th 11 t b v * ore h i s . All tha t \ e can prove 
i s xh a t une ,e d e ^ s mere accomplish d by a T e a t 
c e n t r a l . Prom the f - r e a t General1 uo ^fepol^on* i s 
a lean im oasible for reason to accomplish, an1 t ha i 
i s whv in ov* r T 1 a / l i f e uhe ^roofs of e- iacerce are 
no norn ohan oroof'" of the nauure "some oxinl tn^ 
th in^ i s J suone f t | "t^e accused whose existence i s 
5 
^wen i s a cr iminal"• "/hat bhese proo% accomplish 
i s to ^efirin with exu uence and to show bhau cer ta in 
concepts are a olicab] o uo the ex i s t in^ uhing. If4 
c r i ina l i s one 'ho commits act ions of th is nauuro* 
therefore uhis 1 ,n who acted in t h i s fashion i s a 
cr iminal ." Whac we iave achieved i s a def in i t ion 
or descr ip t ion , a l ink ing of an ex is t ing bhinp to 
an ideo,# And s imi la r ly the proofs for Qodfs 
5 PraaTients, p# 50. 
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exiiceioa. All uh^ L uhey can le^itim tely claim to 
accomplish is uo clarify the concept of God# They 
bepin mith uhe eseap e of God and explicate its 
content* But such a proof of eciatenoe is no 
proof at all for it does not touc1 upon uhe question 
of exir tence or factual being. What the proofs 
achieve i * a tautology hich serves tc explicate 
the nature of God. 
This analysis of the oncological armment is 
6 
^xven a more exelicit form in the Postscript. Tt 
is shown bhau unles^ th^ existence of God in assuned 
in uhe hy io thes i s s zho argument ^ould reduce to tfa 
snpaerje pei^o*
 U s t ex i s t—if he exists 1 1 . The flifff 
can be an lulled only by accenting exisuence as a 
p *e i s e or by a l^a " from the 'must1 to the * do<*sf. 
Reason c a n o t by i t s e l f lead to thin s tep unless i t 
i s preceded by fa.ita rMob accepts such axis uence. 
Essence or Midexl bein^11 does follow necessar i ly 
from Perfection for bb^ perfect beinac must be , since 
beinf i s an aspect of perfect ion. In t h i s sen , ° f 
7 ! lif God i s o s s ib l e , he ia £0 ipso necessary11. But 
such boint i s i l e a l or e s s e n t i a l . I t i s d i s t i n c t 
from ac tua l exiauence or "factual bein^11 which cannot 
6 0»U,P., p . 2^;o. 
7 Prarpients, "o. 52. 
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be proved* Factual b^ ina: does not folio?/ as a 
consequence from proof of ideal bein#. Thus the 
ontcloa;ical aranment side-steDs the difficulty by 
confusing the iosu^, for what needs to be grovel is 
not Godfs essence out his actual being. T'PIS, 
lfthe idea of demonstrating that this unknown 
something (the God) exists, could scarcely 
suggest itself to the Reason. For if the 
God ioes not exist it would of course be 
impossible to arove it; and if hQ does 
exist it world be folly to attempt it." 8 
In so far aa the ohysico-teleoloyical roof 
first propounded oy Socrates begins with t^e existence 
of God as the pre.ii^e, it is superior to che onto-
loxic 1 oroof. Slice God is a concept tV-re is am 
absolute relationship between his existence and deeds, 
The di ficif ty taat one encounters in passing from 
his deeds to uhe eyistoice of 7Tauoleon is o^u 
encountered here; for "iven this idea which is God, 
th° existence of pur^oae in nature can only be 
asc r ibed t o ^ i s d iv ine wisdom. Bnu here a^ain i re 
proceed ^rom an i d e a l i s a t i o n for th^ vmijv t < n t ions 
oi our )o )o chpo we s t a r t i th a re t e i .eive i ^ a l i -
9 . 
zau iono . ,'e never e icounxer m nature T i s d o i ? 
p^r fecu io^ oi purpose , l la t^re f i i^s "na.ny seams of 
8
 rrapye^^f p # 4% 
3 I b i d . , % ,2. 
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frixhtcninn; the enquirer and. distracts him. by many 
10 
a. digression11. But Socrates begins with the 
explicit *:resupnosition of Godfs existence. 
flHe always presupposes the God fs e x i s t e n c e , 
and winder this presupposition seeks to 
interpenetrate nature with uhe idea of 
purpose* Had he been asked why brt pur-
sued bhiia method, he would doubtless have 
exolained that he lacked the couraxe to 
venture out upon so perilous a voyage of 
discovery without having made sure of the 
God's existence behind him. At the word 
of the God he casts his net as if to catch 
the idea of purpose•" 11 
He has na.de sura of God's existence by the dialectic 
of faith and employs reason to explicate the content 
of faith. 
furthermore, from the proof to the existence is 
12 
a "letting golff "a leap11* The proofs for the 
existence of God proceed from the implicit or 
ex "licit assumption that he exists but the proof 
itself does nox directly lead to demonstration of the 
existence. In fact it cannot, as long as 1 am engaged 
in proving it for to prove is to proceed by definite 
and consecutive steps* When engaged in proving 
something the mind anticipates all the moves and is 
unable to perceive the amergence of a new quality 
not derived from the preceding steps or necessitated 
by the following steps. To grasp this new quality, 
reason, must suspend itself. Kierkegaard writes; 
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"And >otT do-s the Godfs existence emerge 
from the proof? Does i t follow straiscbt-
away, without any breach of cont inui ty? Or 
have we not here an analogy xo the behaviour 
of the l i t t l e Cartesian dol ls? As soon as 1 
l e t o-o of zhe dol l "*t stands on i t s n e a \ 
As soon an 1 l e t i t ^o—-I mu°i cherefore l e t 
i t r~o# So also *^'th the proof. As lorcc 
as I ^eep vj bold on the proof, i . e . concirue 
to de m m i r "<=», the ^xi°ience do°s not come 
out, i f fer no other reason chan t'xat 1 BM 
enxa^ed in oroving i t ; bat when 1 l e t tae 
proof xo, the existence i s there . But chis 
act of l e t t i n g ~o i s surely also so^°bhinr? 
i t ta inde d a r ° arkable contribiLLon c f 
mine. must not ohis a lso be taken in to 
account, chis l i t t l e moment, ^ri -*f as i t -ray 
be—ic need not be long, for i t i s a l ean . 
ffowpvor br ief t h i s moment, i f only ^ 
insca^taneons no^, t h i s ftnowft muse be i n -
cluded in cne reasoning." 13 
This r ecep t iv i ty xh°t i s derived from s^a^endi ig 
reason Is a^ain f a i t h . Thus t h - proof for the 
exisLence of God us t nob only be^in with fa i th nut 
mint alao b° coiplem^nted b^ f a i t h . Existence 
cannot em^-r^e from x ^ proof unlesa i t i s perceived 
14 threpoix f a i t h . 
15 Pragmenxo, p . ,$. 
14 In the Pr^yn^nts Kierkegaard eatplicity denies 
the uae of tTTrwoFT^aith for be l ie f in God in the 
Socrat ic s e i s e . ?e wr i t e s ; "from the e t e rna l 
point of v ie^ one does not have Faith thao the God 
ex i s t s { eater m l ty i s ) , even i f one asc^i^s that 
hQ do°s ex is t s The use of che ?^ord ?aib° i i Jhis 
connection enshrines a misunderstanding. Socrates 
did not have faiuh tha t the God existedm What he 
knew about the God he arrived at hy way of r e c o l l e c -
t i o n ; th* Godfs existence was for him hy no means 
h i s t o r i c a l existence*11 (Tbidj p . Ks8) never the less , i n bhe
 Pos t sc r ip t , as so^vm in the previous chapter , 
he does" rf\i^1rTo^^ocraxic f a i t h in God as fa i th and 
ne lakes a n i s t i i c t i o n between Soc«auic f a i th and 
Christ ian f a i t h i i regard to " s t reouos i ty" . The 
oassage quoted above seems Lo e pihasir.e th i s 
diSuinct ion. 
Reason c n i 1 ^ comprehend e x i s t e n c e fo r ex ta teneo 
i s nau necenaa y . GOT t i n " i n t o exx be KJP LP a o1ja"*e* 
Change "ores-1 noses t h a t which cban^ep. ftlhat *Tbicb 
under *oer uh % c * ^ o cannot be uho lecessa^ - l o r 
%\^£* necessary i s by d e f i n i t i o n tb=>t Trhich i s . ^ a 
necessary uherc "o ^ c nnoi coiio i n t o ex i t ence . 
Conversely, cn^t ^hio^ comes i n t o a x i c t e i o e cannot 
no so ov n e c e s s i t y "**or i ^ r e i t l e ce s sa ry i t ^oulr l b e , 
and i t s op i in^ L^to ex i t ence i?oulrl t ape he p r ° c l ded. 
lor c n If t nx h eon° r inuo e x i s t e n c e Income 
oecossary V r comii r i n t o °x io te*ce fo r t h a t l a a 
°el" r-co ' l t r '"di cuio ) . «othi> ^ becomes nec^ssar**. ^be 
necessary i s . T u s , 
11
 Ivor chi ^ Thich oom^j i n t o ex i Gepce 
"rove"1 J a c i s e l h~r comin^ i i t o exx be ice 
x x
r
 u i t in ^ox neceos^ y , f o r fee only 
u% in- T fiica Cc moc come i n t o exiauence i s 
che n^cessa/r , because t h ° neeosscr*7" i s . s t 15 
But t a a t which ooa°n i n t o e x i s t e ic° must nave a 
boin<- / r i o r uo i t s comin_ xnxo acuua l iuy f o r eo xin^ 
m c o e x i s c o ' c e i s "a e* xn^e. 1 e v e r t h e l ^ n s , t b i s ) r io r 
bain-* n a t lot change 11 the t r a n s i t i o n to ex i s t ence 
fo r t ' ^ n ,*hab c^ los in uO ex i s t ence i s nob . this but some 
o the r s u b j e c t . Also i t i^ accessary tha t t h ^ r e be 
such a p r i o r beli-? fo r r i c h o u t i t eo^in^ in bo e x i s t e n c e 
would not he a change a t a i l . Thus comii^ i n t o 
15 ? ragi lyn t s , D . 91* 
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existence presuu *»oaes a being which is a non-being 
and also is not necessary. Possibility is precisely 
such, a being. Therefore "the change of coming into 
existence is a transition from possibility to 
actuality." 
Goxiing into existence is historical for in 
undergoing the change that is coming into existence 
the subject of change enters into a dialectic with 
time. In other words, it acquires a past? a present 
and a future. Of these, the past alone is historical 
17 for it alone is. The present is not yet fully 
and the future has not happened. But to say that 
the past is, is not to imply that it is necessary. 
^ Z£^J££i£f ?* 31 • f^ie argument rests a ;on the 
nresupnbsiti n that existence is a change, that 
it is a flcoi:ji2£ in'GO existence", a transition from 
one state to another. It therefore becomes necessary 
to posit a atate prior Lo uhe change ^hiek is 
coning into existence. This xist be so in viev; of 
the intended "Application" of the argument the subject 
of which is the Incarnation, which is by definition 
the eternal become historical. Further, in arguing 
that the necessary cannot come into existence because 
it is, Kierkegaard seems to commit she confusion of 
categories which he points out in connection with the 
classical proofs for the existence of God. The 
nacessary is, in the sense that it has ideal being* 
From this it does not seem possible uo deduce whether 
it can or cannot li 've factual or actual being because 
"the coming-into-existence kind of change....is not a 
change in essence but in being, and is a transition 
from not existing to existing.fl (Fragments^ p# 91) 
Further on in the same section, Kierkegaard alludes 
to this distinction when he writes "necessity....is 
not a determination of being but a determination of 
essence since it is the essence of the necessary 
to be". (Frafpients^  p. 92) 
17 fragments, p* 97* 
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hike a l l ulnn^s ibat come into existence the p°st i s 
a p o s s i b i l i t y turned inxo a c t u a l i t y . As such, only 
i t s ac tual content , tho "thus" i s necessary, not t i e 
"how". The p o s s i b i l i t y ealined i s one of many 
p o s s i b i l i t i a. ^h "thus" could ave heen ^.ealiped 
d i f fe ren t ly for eonin^ i n o oxisb^me i ^ves place 
not by necessi ty but by freedom* for that, which i s 
necessary does nor come in to exi c tence and th A which 
has come i m o existence cannot be ^c^ssamr, 
The corai/ix in to exl^tenc^ of God, the Tncarnauion, 
i s h i s t o r i c a l ; a i h i s t o r i c a l , i t i s not iecossarv. 
I t i s a free a c t . 
Ifo f n t " ° uast known? in object can he kiown 
by immeat- ~p aensauion or cognition hue how do we 
kiow that xt io h i^uor ica l , that i t has cooe in to 
exia tence and nas a past? S i ce che past i s not 
necessary i t cannot he "mown by reason. Reason can 
aoorenen^ only the oecessary, that which i i , whereas, 
the mast i s nom^thinat that has come inLo beinr and 
therefore ca r r i e s ^ i tn i t a two-fold uncer ta in ty ; tha t 
i t was not and has c-^e to he and t^a t in doing so 
has lf nnihilaiad11 a oos l ih i l iuy in thus emerging into 
accua l i ty . Alao, t h i s annihi la t ion of a jooaxbilixy 
i s the peg t ion ef every other pos s ib i l i t y for bhe 
"thus" of the object or che event precludes the 
p o s s i b i l i t y oi i t s ever being otherwise, since che 
45 
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"thus" has actually come into being. Season can 
apprehend the possible but it cannot grasp the actual 
existence. 
19 Coming into existence has an "elusiveness11, - an 
uncertainty which cannot be annulled by immediate 
cognition. By immediate cognition and sensation all 
that we know is that the object is present. Our 
immediate apprehension of a star is a certainty; but 
as soon as reflection enquires whether it exints, 
that is, if it has come into existence, we e-*-counter 
an uncertainty which renders questionable the immediate 
impression of the star which to begin with was a 
certainty* A similar uncertainty attends the his-
toricity of events. The "thus" of the event, that 
isf its content, is known, but whether it has happened 
is an issue which cannot be resolved cognitively. 
Therefore the historical oresupposes a mode of 
apprehension which, mirros the uncertainty of coming 
into existence and"resolves it in its own certainty. 
Such a mode of apprehension is faith. But such. 
apprehension in not knowledge for fax .h xa a resolution 
of the wi"il, a tar ixaulon of the uncertainty by a 
decision. 'Vat the :eoislve^ess of faith1 s|rrt still 
countenance the possibility that the object or event 
18 Fragments, p. 101. 
19 Ibid, p. 100. 
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could h rWe hae i oth *r r ist . TV*- b e 1 i Q v i ^ * "in i t , 
fa tbh "ne o t con L^r u on i t s < oj^ct a n e c e s s i t r 
thac foes not h ^ i a ^ to i t . I t a f f i r m the e x i ^ t e i c e 
of "u i h^ect a id a t the same time concede i t s 
COITULI xnc ix T a r , "wi ldca t d e i y i i ^ the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of ano ther "n^us" , t h i s p r e s e n t "uhus" i s or b ' l L e f 
moat c e r t a i n " . l 
In i d s na up^e as t?;n ac^ of the w i l l , f a i t h i s 
analogous no n*ccf>m~ ^caPGxcia • fo r houb are "o taces 
of a n d " . kant1^ a m n i o the d %xct by an a c t oT the 
w i l l whereas the s c e p t i c preserved the doubt by 
" i l l i ^ T nob .,o a r r i v e a t
 a c inc lus ion . ^o l u che 
b e l i e v - r m l tb~ -c°~>t,Lc a^r^e ubat e raoa ' a s i t s 
roo t in ta^ w i l l hurt t 7 hi l e tb« i c e p t i c on t h i s around 
r e fu se s ,o form a conc lus ion , the b ^ l i ^ v ^ r accen t s 
the r i s k of e r r o r in ^ i l l i n ^ t o b e l i e v e # 
"Whei f a in i r e s o l / e s t o b e l i e v e i t runs the 
r i s k of co imix t inx i t s e l f to e r r o r , but i t 
n e v e r t h e l e s s b e l i e v e s , ^here i s no o the r 
roa 1 t o f a i t h ; i f one \ i s i s to escape r i s k , 
i t i s aa i f one wanted xo know with ^ e r a a i n t y 
t h r c he can awi i before r^oin^ i n t o the 
v/a tor ." 21 
In h i s wilf ,o *oo t f t h u s , the H-ree1- see mtc 
recai^cJ the \as ion of reason and h i? " a t a r axy •### 
was th reform a i e x i s t e n t i a l atxem t t o mis t rac t 
from ex i s tence" . """ Thought, though i t a b s t r a c t e d 
20 ? ra -men t s f p . 103. 
21 I b i d > t p . 103 n . 
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f r o , exis tence , wr o mc t o t a i l y unrelated to ic in 
as rah as th^re was an inter-relation&hlp between 
uhoinxht and ^ i ^ i e n c e t Tf t^  ou^ht i°d to uhe ^osiuin^ 
of scopt ic is i i , s j o ^ t i c i s became a tray of l i f e * I t 
became an cubical c ^ i o a . Thus eve" the ace^t ics 
amon^ f the GreQ ' chinkers had due re^'ird for the 
task of l i v i i ^ . "^ese r t i ^ exis tence , severing 
a l to^e th^r che t i Q s o-1 thought with l iv ing i s 
therefore oh* unparal leled d i s t i n c t i o n , Fi^rkenaar^ 
ould say, oC oneculative philosophy* His c r i t ique 
of chis l ^ t t ^ r focuses noon hjo aspects of i t : 
Cartesian ahsiro,ec thought and ^enelian Dure f^ou^ht. 
^he r e f i c i e i cy of abs t rac t thought l i e s in 
i t s i n a b i l i t y lo <xrasp exis tence , ^hi^i, however, must 
be so, fo" vh^ ^ r t ^ e r i a r de ' i ^ s thoughts iu i s in 
the Process of becoming. As lonr £s the o»rtLeviar 
and t,%e ac tual ^vc i r a c l e t e l off from r e a l i t y , r e a l i t y 
presents a x-'AcaiPe o^oi ct for thought. But the 
aroble i thus e ] jtrued i s a f a l s i f i c a t i o n ~k>r the 
p a r t i c u l a r xs a jart of r e a l i t y . Abstract tho^^ht 
or r a t i o I I P I nou only does not envisage r e a l i t * in 
i t s t o t a l i b f buu iz e l iminates the probl° i a l together 
by obviating the contradict ion hetmeen the "nmrfcxcular 
ahd the ^eneral in che v ry process of abs t r ac t ion . 
Thus the f l f in J>P Cartesian co^ito erxo sum i s a 
48 
"DU^O e^o11 which ex i s t s not xs an actual human bein^ 
in t i e but sub ^J>^cie aetenni f so that the ipopoaicion 
23 i s a m x*e tautology* Thought el iminates tae 
p^a3icuLar individual because i t cannot think the 
paru icul^r . From t h i s i t proceeds to deduce hau 
the p - r txcp la r has o r e a l i t y or That cannot be 
thought r 10u r e a l , since thought corresoonds to 
rcaLLtv# 
m|ie r*a] ±n the r e i e r a l and an i s Tan* ^ e r e -
fore the ioueresta of uhe i r t i c u l a r i plividp 1 * av* 
no relevance to a as t rac t thought a^d Us in t e re s t ed 
thinking i s y k ^ e e as a. v i r t u e , ^i^ce xho^^ht i s 
incapable o concerning t i se l f with the "a r t i cu l a r , 
thi iking in i t s h i ^ a p orm rramt be Ks cmniished 
by a to ta l abs^n e oC a^a divorce rron the n°ro icu lar . 
The w r y i i mi ballon of abs t rac t thoarht beco ^ s i «s 
viruue. Of-us i t lol lops ^hnt the ^ a h l e ^j of uhe 
l i v i i r Individ » l a '- not p^t subjects for uhoe"bt. 
Becaxae of iai c unconcern the abs t rac t ts inker 
marries "but without kiovini: love or i t s mo^er" and 
l i s "marriage rum I tcv* oeen as imporsojal as his 
24 thought"# For j je sane reason, wnen abs t rac t 
t ' o n r b t coi iders iomoruali ty, i t inevluaoly 1 °a *es 
out t i e f o r t i o r i r individual and proceeds co analyze 
the concept. 
id J y < 11»1 • , P . c~o | * 
24 Tfctd . , :>. 2 8 . 
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"A P i x c . t1 or * it u u s ] el a^ ^e i. i t h r o f i -°0u 
co my x J 10 x a l i ^ y by f i r s t a^  n i h i l 3 , i n «e 
oc a n a r i m c u l ^ r e x i r t m - r i*» l i v i ^ u i l n*~ ^-en 
a i 0s v i ti v i o l , ooop t a s "hen t h e d o c t o r 
i n o i b ^ r n " i l l e d ne p a t i a 11 P I ZO M S ' o n e i n o ™ -
"ut a l o e - ~ e l l n d uhe f e v Q r . f f 25 
Ao^uracx t i o n i i t an s t r e e t s / r p " - l u n e o . 
iToverth^Xe r i t ^oes o^ t o t a l l y s icoe° 3 xn eoo in<x 
a i a a t r a c o t o i J O * n ~ eps oe h ^ a i c u i o i b e „ » e e n 
t h i n n e r o^r1 h o t - h t ; i i x e x a i n s ihe s ib i Cu ^^en f iOu r h 
aa an cb t r ^ c ^ i o n . n h e fMo t e x h a n a t i / e a ^a t r a c t i o n 1 1 , 
h^ e e *•, i s i % hi o1 -> a ^hieveme x ox c •=» i ^  • ^ i r e 
IPJ VI b o l L C 1 I " 1 " l J "» D P ! ' 1 4 L uh u1 xi h t . l o r ) i u e 
i t s t > i r e b ) i r e , ah v a c t ho b r e t a i n s a 
r i m KJ i ) o \c i i *IVI m l . l u r e vf o hu a ol"1 ^hes 
"^^ e i "» ™ i . ^ ^ i t f ^i ^ahiD by t r a n s C e p mi ' 
p a & o ° ' ^ c a a c a u ° or~r i t n m t h o u g h t ifc°e"if. Vhus 
i t 8co1P3 uo e i c ./i ^r-ad i c t i o n in e ^ s uence f 1 ^ r e i n 
i t i s o u1 " e n ^ ^ c ^ heoxa e i -»-& no A _,e i ^ uhe 
e c e r i L u of u h c u d t . ixnce t " O u r h t i s s_rh ?^J*Jl_e 
aety t a i f u *» c x 1 -* io ° i u h ^ / / o r i n fnap*nx f n o r 
c " a ie n d a ->! o° i n i t . ffnus y i d n ? H i ^ i n ^ V n ? 
. t l , h a r r % u , m r ^ ibmu h„ d*n ne > exi u^  ico and 
r e k i c e s -* u ue x ^ p o a , 3xit h° ~xn f d eo i r t c o i r a x i i j u i o i 
o jd iovr r»nUf Le ^ i i £ ) l o m c nev r i ^ e i e ^ x a "* p t ~ of 
t 1 ^ 0 ^ 1 wn r o r i c p ^ m r m s of on u r Q c i o l u n , 
?7 x ? j P u ? or nsx^xoi "m,o# 
26 C p . ^ . , r), 9 r /a . 
27 l U ' U T). ?70. 
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The x > a o«rt uhe i d e n t i t y of c l iorrb c vid b^iny c m 
only anply Lo surely i e r t l m a a n ^ i c ^ ?1xae e x i s t e n c e 
co inc ides iuk bhe cono^t . orch i s the r ° a l ? of 
I d e a s . "HUG * n i s IGO P I d e a . For i s His e x i s t e n c e 
t o t a l i s k v ^ i J ox* Idea, t i ke t ha t of a ro ie# p~is i s 
an i n l o t ^ d i ' t e ^ r m e u c e a,Prl hnre f1^ r r ^ l o i ef 
i ' e^ t i t* r of thoux-^r and hein • h p ^ iot app ly . ?hns f 
" e x i r t e n c o i s always sorietM *r "n n i c u l r f 
th? aco t racu does not exi x t P ro i chis GO 
draw che conclus ion t h a t the a b s t r a c e i s 
wi t »ovt v i i " i t i s a n i s u o k r s . a n d b m ; but 
i t i s a l s o a misun , ers tand in r " to crnfound 
t iaconrse oi even r a i s i ^ t h ° ques t ion of 
e x i s t e n c e , or r e a l i t y in the r^p .p of o x M t -
e^ce f Li cjn i^ct ion with the a b s t r a c t . fpen 
am e x i s t i n g ind tv idu L r a i s e s bho n r x s t i o n of 
the r a t a ion between tho^Pht and beipp8, 
t h i n k i ^ y p ' " exx p-i^p, md oV»ilosonhy ex a la l i a 
t h a t I t i s one of i d e n t i t y , t* e a isTFer "Joes not 
r e p l y oo uhe aud i t i on because xc ^o°s rjo* r e p l y 
t o uh" qa°s uioner.1 1 28 
Pur t ° r f Ghoukc c PI be i d e n t i c a l only with 
what i f i risheo and c o ^ l e t e . I t i s by v i rcvo of 
t h i s reason t ' j , t oure t n o i ^ h t concerns M s e l " e x c e s s i v e l y 
w ich the i a t . kut i*r^  i the s t andpo in t of che Q x i s t i n ^ 
Ind iv id^ i l ir, i s imposs ia t • to Tinders ta id Jie pa s t 
as a t o t a l i t y , ^hp f i n i t u d e of the pxislina* i n d i v i d u a l 
s u b j e c t s hi i P I lersxanrfxn - o ' the pas t t o a Q u a n t i t a t i v e 
d e t e r i la.uion so bhaj :he Treat and not the crood 
emerxes as worthy of remark. ? h i s must be so Tor 
only God has access uo xhe motives of man; the e x i s t i n g 
28 O.U.P. , p . 294* 
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individual can only know actions, and that too only 
partially* Thus, 
"lor God, the apprehension of the historical 
is interpenetrated by his knowledge of the 
inmost secrets of conscience, alilca in the 
greatest and the humblest. If a human being 
seeks to occupy this standpoint he is a fool; 
if he refrains from such an attempt, he will 
have to content himself with a survey of the 
more Prominent items, and this is precisely 
what makes the quantitative the decisive factor 
in the selection. That the ethical is oresent 
lo the historical process, as it is everywhere 
where God is, is not on this account denied. 
But it is denied that the finite spirit can see 
it in truth....M 29 
Farther, the knowledge of the historical must always 
remain an approximation, for the material is infinite* 
It constantly changes -mid increases. Therefore a 
30 beginniny is an arbitrary limitation. 
The historical is uncertain and there can be no 
conclusive knowledge in regard to it. ft is for this 
reason that attempts at establishing the authenticity 
of Christianity objectively as an historical truth 
are bound to fail.^ Koreover, even the most exhaustive 
critical examination of the Scriptures can only hope 
to prove the authenticity of the canon, in terras of 
philology and such other criteria of scholarship• 
Bu% for the believer, the authenticity of the capon 
rests upon inspirationc And inspiration is a duality 
31 that cannot be proved. Further, such objective 
9 C^U»r •, p# 1 c t- • 
30 Ibid5 p. 134. 
31 Ibid, p. 29. 
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certaiity, assu™in<* tint it can be attained, will not 
succeed in converting a non-believer uor will it be 
of use to the believer. On the contrary, it t7ill 
endanger the believer1 s faith by removing the 
uncertainty, 
,!
#.*#in this voluminous kno^'led^o, this 
certainty th t lurks at the door of faith 
a^ d threatens xo devour it, he (the believer) 
is in so dan^ orovai a situation that he will 
neea to put forth much effort in m?eat fear 
and tre^blin^, lest he fall a victim to the 
temptation DO confuse knowledge wish faith. 
v/hile faith has hitherto bad a profitable 
schoolmaster in the axis tins uncertainty, it 
would have in the new certainty its most 
dangerous enemy. For if passion is eliminate* 
faith no longer exists, ana certainty and 
passion do not o^ together1*. 32 
And so also atte ipts at craving that the present Church 
is the Apostolic Church. As soon as a clai^ to 
atthenticity is based on historicity, uncertainty 
invades the issue a, id makes a decision iiaoossiole. 
Sneculntive oiilosophy treaxs Christianity as 
an istorlcal fnenoienon. But the historical is the 
past and the i ^t reveals itself with an uncertaintv 
th^t reason cannou resolve* 'jJbus tue historical 
cannot be '-noi/n and does not have an i mediate 
32 C.U.?., p. 30* Parpen thesis mine. 
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con uC rporc ry • k i s ^n objec t of f a l ' h . iki?t « x f 
s ince f se s i x t o r l c a l ^henomep^n in
 whis case \ 3 a 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i me^ince contemporanei ty dorp TOP 
confer an a d v i n t a k e ; °or the immediate contemporary ^s 
wel l as tf1? l a t e r •~isei 'nle Chr i s t X!CIG r e -»*• tp nn 
ob jec t of f a i t h . 2ce fxoz j u n i so ixxny hundreds 
of »."ears Nave in te rvened pnd 'e*»era i c n have a t t e s t e d 
co i t '*oes not melee G h r i s t i a n i t y n e c e s s a r - . ^he p a s t 
i s not necessa •- en-~ ^oes not kecope necessary by 
^ e l " " ap xeha^Ha^^^ And nbac i s noc noc°ssary l i e s 
beyond |f,^  scom^ of r e a s o n . 
C1^ eetxvo C h r i s t i a n i t y i s a ehi j ^ ra because 
Ohr iP t i an iu* 1 not a fyiven f . TG i s an en1 each 
i n d i v i ' u a l nus t r e a l i f e ±o^ h imsel f . I t i s i r i t 
ap 1 zh aaaforo can o^ly by a^p *ehend^d by a sif A c t i v i t y . 
For ''o^l*; uhe ] HCP i s »mkrsuoo l b ^ the l ike".** 
33 Frg^xi__eptsf I n r ^ r l ' i ^ e . 
34 C . r . P . , o. A. 
Pai ch and_ Reason 
The problem of faith an^ rea.son has its root 
in the commonly observed incongruity between thouxht 
and action. One finds oneself 
,f
.. .sitting at a desk and writiny about 
what one ha,s never a one... .writing de 
omnibus duoitandum and a.c the same time 
I>eij^ ^ exis tcntially as the 
™ost scnrxiop° of men", 1 
Ordinarily life proceeds upon an implicit dichotomy 
behween the realm of thought and the sphere of 
action. Gonerally this distinction is not even 
consciously recognized. But nevertheless there 
exiits a disparity in one!s actitude towards 
principles a^ c1 events T^ich do not Hreotly impinge 
upon onefn existence and those which do au^ thereby 
depiand a decisive response. In -natters which do not 
immediately concern ne thought is °iven a, free rein 
and it unfolds acoordi^g to its innate necessity. 
Its cone!unions are accepted and applied objectively, 
if at all* Hot only scientific truths but the principles 
of xoral law seem usually to be regarded in this 
fashiono Consistency and dispassionateness are seen 
as the virtues of moral Jud^epcnt and xhe moral 
code or a society is built upon such dispassionate 
1 0,lJ.P.f r. 179* 
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reflection. Since the moral code has its justifi-
cation in principles of universal applicability it 
leaves the particular individual secure and unmoved 
in his anonymity. This is so for generally no 
individual cap see his immediate concerns as 
coinciding with a generality. They axse varied and 
unique, in short, particular. The universal appeals 
to abstract ubouyht and thought crm reveal diverse 
possibilities but cannot differentiate between the*.. 
The possibilities prostate'"1 are alike in their 
indifference because difference belongs to the realm 
of actuality or particulars* [ik.us, when one has 
inhabited the reals of thought sufficiently lonx to 
be ax/are of the emptiness of its disjunctions one 
learns to respond as Kierkegaard1s aesthetic youna 
man does: i?ky r^vera^. contemporary, you misunderstand 
me. I am pot in the parte at all. 1 aw outside like 
2 
a tiny ouanish 's1.11 
!Tb e in di vi dual., ' t h en, c orno rt s h im s a If t owar ds 
the universal in canfor- ixy with its abstract nature. 
But he does so only until he comes into conflict with 
it. "7hen the universal moral law contradicts the 
particular, morality acquires a new perspective for 
it has thrust itself into a subjectivity. A 
matter which till then was of little more personal 
2 J|/0 II, p. 175 - 176, 
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significance than, a law of nature i.s under most 
circumstances, suddenly stands forth with a fullness 
of import because from the domain of abstract thought 
it has transposed itself into an individual 
existence* It becomes an either/or. 
It is thus in an individual consciousness that 
the ethical acquires concretion. The ethical demands 
a choice, a decisive commitment to distinguish the 
good from, the evil. And there can be no good and 
evil in abstraction for good and evil are values. 
Values presuppose interest, a purpose, and, purpose 
can reside only in a subjectivity. Yiewed abstractly, 
transposed into the realm of the collective or the 
universal
 9 /rood and evil are transfer led into the 
"greater11 and the "lesser". They cease to be 
qualities and become quantitative determinants, 
because outside xhe ambit of subjectivity only effects 
arc perceived* Therefore good eom-s to he remarried 
not as an ultimate quality but only as xhxt which 
is conducive to this or that objective end and a 
relativism is introduced which converts evil into 
that which is -o more than something not productive 
of that end. Evil is the absence of good and good 
the absence of evil. Good and evil thus cease to be 
absolute an d PO sitive. 
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"It is for this reason that 13 chics looks 
upon -11 world-historical knowledge '-xth a 
dexree of suspicion, because it y so 
easily V-co :a a snare, a demoralv i^x 
aesthet c div rsion for uhe knowing subject, 
insofar as the A~ a tineJion between what does 
or does iot have historical significance 
obeys a quantitative dialectic. As a conse-
quence of thi3 fa?x, the absolute distinction 
between good an \ evil tenia for the historical 
survey to V- neutralised In "t^ o aesthetic-
^etaphyslo "1 -Vter "in.Htion of the great and 
the significant, to T,,hich category th-; had 
has orxial cA itta^co with xhe -ood." 5 
T-xp- in the ethical choice ""he individual 
accepts and acknowledges hi--: inr?aidnes *. In. other 
words, he eh cos-mi himself, posits hi 'sel"" ahsolutely. 
The ethical, therefore, individualises. Further, 
through the decisiveness derived from the ethical 
choice of inwardness, the individual affirms God; 
"...God com^s into being for him,11 and the ethical 
becomes an expression of God-relationship. Thus 
"the ethical is...a correlative to individuality and 
that to such a leprae that each individual apprehends 
the ethical essentially only in himself because the 
5 
ethical in Ac complicity Tith God." In short, 
the ethical is the positing of inwardness which is 
faith. Por "faith is: sbat the self in hein^ itself 
and in villijg xo bo itself is grounded transparently 
in God."6 
5 0JJfP«> p. 120. 
4 Ibidf ptt 124* 
5 Ibid , p. 158. 
6 Soren Kieke,gaard, Sickness Unto Death, Tr# vlalter Lowrig, 
(Princeton : PriFoFF^^ , 1941, 1969), 
p* 213* 
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But uo * is faith posited? Faith is posited hy 
reason by virtue of its innate uncertaincy whereby 
it mu^t alw xas deal mmth the possible. Thoxxiat is 
necessarily thought about the unknown. This is so 
because even when reflecmion occupies itself with 
uhat which is actual, it approaches it as am entitv 
endowed T« ith unknown possibilities, chac is, it -eals 
tTith it f.r the unknown. In its passion to reveal, 
it ixfects wi ,b uncertainty everything it touches. 
Further, it is zhe «ature of thornght to reach beyond 
itself to posit something it cannot conceive. This 
is xhe paradoxical oasp ion of reason
 # 
"....the hi "best ""itch of every -as si on is 10 
will its o-n do nfell; un^ so it is s loo the 
supreme passio1 of t-e Reason co seal: a 
collision, though this collision must in one 
way or another prove its undoing. The supreme 
paradox of all thought is xhe attempt to 
discover sow^thiig thpt thought cannot think. 
This pas ion is at bottom present in all 
thinking, even in the thinking of the individual, 
in so far as in thinkinx he participates in 
something transcending himself.11 7 
By the inherent compulsion of ixs o^ n nature, 
then, reason points to the unhnown at ^very steo. 
By the sane paradoxical passion, it yosits God, che 
Unknown* This unkiown :ust of necessity remain the 
unknown for it is xAe unknowable. In its paradoxical 
passion reason has oosited semething Tiiio% transcends 
7 Fra^ ien^s, p. 47. 
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reason hy virtue of its unlikeness to it. Reason 
has in faci posited "ts own limit. But having 
positeu the unknown reason cannot let go and with-
draw. It oust Perpetually contend wich its 
unkn o\ xfhili ty. 
"The _rradopical lassion of the Reason thus 
comes repeatedly into collision ''ith this 
TTnk^ O'M, which .does indeed exist, "hut is 
unknown, and in so far does not exist, The 
Season cmnot a 'vance beyond this point, 
and y^t ix cannot refrain in its a raooxioal-
ness frsri arriving at this limit and occppyi tg 
itself therewith. It will lot serve to dismiss 
its relation co it simply oj asserting taat 
tNe Unknown does not e^ isfc since this itself 
involves a reincionship. But ^ hnt then is the 
"Unknown, since the designation of it as the God 
merely signifies for us that it is rn,:noxm*i 
To say that it is the TJnknoxm because it 
cannot be known, and even if it were capable of 
being kno-p, it could not bo expressed, does 
not satisfy th° demands of passion, though it 
correculy interprets the Unknown as a limit; 
but a li lie is precisely a torment L'or passion, 
though it also serves as an incitement. And 
yet che Reason cap come no further, whether it 
risks ai is >ue via negation is or via eyineptia.11 8 
Furtoer, fne positing of the Unknown by Heason 
establishes a relationship ^hich dis^ip^tos xaofs 
cert i tude r ega rd ing h imsel f . In G o d - r o i a . i o i s h i p 
self-knowledge mixes Place t o an u>*» re solvable uncerta inty . 
Kierkecraare w r i t e s : 
"...the paradoxical passion of xhe Reason, 
while as yet a iv:ce Presentiment, recro-
actively af?ects nan and his self-knowledge, 
so that he T ho thought to know himself is 
8 Prag^ienus, p. 55* 
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no longer certain whether he is a more 
strangely composite animal than fyphon 
or if *~ perchance his nature contains a 
gentler and diviner part." 9 
Thus by its own impulsion reason displaces itself 
by creating a possibility which can only be grasped 
by an act of the will; either an affirmation of the 
self before Gox in faith, or its denial before God 
in sin. Reason abdicates by giving* Place xo this 
10 disjunction. But in doing so it does nox negate 
itself. It is present in the existential choice as 
tb° elarian
 u of objective uncertainty. !2lAs uncertainty 
is an essential aspect of faith for f-'ith is "not a 
form of knowledge but a free act, an expression of 
11 
will1.1 lior is faith a blind affix-nation, an impulse 
or inspiration. V/ere it such, faith would not be am 
a'it of the will, nor would it car 17/ with it the 
eternal responsibility which attaches to deliberate 
decision. On the contrary, subjectivity, in which 
decisiveness inheres, must have present before it "the 
memento of the fork in the road", xhe objective 
10 To say this, however, is not to imply that reason 
directly leads to sin or faith, ox* necessitates 
either* Reason, on the contrary," merely leads to 
uncertainty which by the existing individual is 
resolved by a free act of the will, by a leap either 
of sin or of faith. It is possible, as in the sphere 
of the aestbetica.1, to remain in the iincertainty, 
but we are here concerned 1th the decisive, the' 
ethical or the existential. 
^ .^^iLlxEM^ P* 103. 
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e v i r es° ion foe t r u c u . i/ithouu th i^ con mau 
r c i i ^de r of the r i sk of e r ror Kierkegaard's notion 
of f a i th v i n los ius nninpe character of a t! »Lli-
1 ? t an t c e r t a in ty" . " I t w i l l lose i t s e t i o l o g i c a l 
import, cease to he a i ooli ration, and assume che 
n*u t ran zy of ku>wled<*e. The objective un^ertaintj^ 
oresrnted hy reason invests fa i th ^ i t l i t s essenuia] 
tension afl "o t renuosi ty" . Thus, 
"T conce mlnte tb^ order of nata e in che 
hoae of f tpidi ig God, and 1 see ormt" oce ioe 
and wisdom, but 1 also see ruch else tha t 
d is turbs ij An^l xpd exci tes a i x i e t v , nho 
sun ef r l l oh±3 i s an objective u n c e r t a i j t y . 
But i t i i or Ghis ve ^ reason chat inward-
ness becomes as intense as i t i s , for i t 
eibraces t s i s objectLve uncer ta in ty ^iGh th° 
en ire pas a on of the in f in i t e ." 13 
Further , the r i * c entai led in f a i th also i n i f e s t s 
i t s e l f as "te r t a t i o ^ " , an rm^e to revore i t ^ e i P , for 
reason i s T jI n^g sted once the decision of Faith i s 
fa-la buu ooncinnns to de l ibera te unon p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
"Vii^ n T a i de l inera t inx i t i s \y uask to 
think everv yossxhii xty; but hen 1 have 
decided, aid co i^enpently acted invar^ly , 
a ch-p^e ta, ~s i a c e so t h a t i t i s now ny 
ton1- m T'crd against fur ther de l ibe ra t ion , 
exoeot in so Car so lethin^ requires to be 
undone." And chen, "the way uo a new 
resolv ^oes through repentance.11 14 
?ai th chxr contends wi ch an xnsep rable r i s k 
aid t h i s eon- t i tuccs xts d i a l e c t i c a l t ens ion . I t i s 
12 0 J T . P . , p . 203# 
13 Ib id , p . 182, 
14 Ibid . , D . 304n. 
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in the lipht of this tension that Abraham's decision 
achieves f!il significance# Abraham was compelled to 
15 
acknowledge a, con cradiccion between che ethical 
and che religious* Both have an imperative claim 
of obedience ximon the individual r.pA in the unev^nt-
fulness o^ day n day life one assumes th z the lorms 
of morality and obedience bo God are mutanlly 
complementary and uo obey the one is to acknowledge 
the other. Abraham, however, was compelled to choose 
between the two* And his res on so, as Kierekegaa-trd 
represents it, Tfa a decision in full awareness of xhe 
implications of the choice and iot mere blind 
obedience# 
"The euhicai expression for Hia.u Abraham did 
is th t h^ would murder Isaac; the religious 
expression is than he would sacrifice Isaac; 
but preci"?eVr in chis contradiction consists 
the dread which can veil make a man sleepless, 
and yet Abraha 1 is not what he is without this 
dread." 16 
The reasonability of "Thou sb*l i not kill11 is manifest; 
but also, once the^i^ea of God is posited, i: is 
reasonable that "...with God all things are possible"• ' 
Tie as on cannot laaxl to the affirmation ox* denial of the 
one of uhe oth-r and therefore Abraham brinxs reflection 
to conclusion in the only may it is Lossihv to do so, 
that is, in faith. Thus uhe seeming irrauioixliti 
15 In Fear and grenbling: Kierkegaard ipias z^e term 
ethic A uo si^iify universal r*oraiit^r cn^ xn xhe 
Postscript to indie te the decisive, oho existential. 
16 Sore1 ICi< rkc n~rdf J?earL and mrei .•yLinc^  rPr# faloer Lowrie, 
(Princeton, Drinceton University Press, 1941, 1°69)? 
p. i>7. 
^ Z?-^ir- J®1?.. ^^ht^:..!11!!^ P » 5 ^ # 
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of Abraham1s conduct does not indicate the absence 
of deliberation but lies in the choice of the parti-
cular alternative. He chose what the ma.ioriuy of 
mankind would not choose. But that precisely is the 
nature of the ethical. In decision man is individualized; 
1R 
"... the im dividual stands alone11. 
Thus, 0'"ce xv-ason posits God, it is constrained 
to countenance "the absurd11, that through faith one 
regains the finite. It lies within manfs power to 
give up the finite in infinite resignation, but he 
cannot re-possess the finite by his own power. There-
fore, he must regain it through the omnipotence of 
God. In other words, the object of faith is not 
absurd, only the act of faith is# Faith is absurd 
because it places xK-e individual in an absolute 
relationship with the absolute in supersession of the 
universal. She absurdity lies in the relationship; 
it is a leap, lie as on postulates God but it does not 
necessitate the relationship; it is something the 
individual contributes. Having posited the relation-
ship the individml rvlns ifthe double movementif of 
re s x xn a tion ana re turn zo t h e fin ite. And b a rein 
lies th-r difference between Socratic faith and faith 
as it is described in Fear and Trembliny. Socratic 
18 C.U.P., p. 287. 
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f a i t h affix" is God by a l e a p hue i t does »ot e x p l i c i t l y 
ac1 nowle^ge xhe consequence cuch a f f i r ^ n cion a n c a i l n , 
which i s fame i t l a c e s xhe 1 i d iv i au° l i i a d i r e c t 
r e l a c i ' o s b i n n God. Kierkegaard w r i t e s ? 
"Chn connoisseur in self-knowledge Vi?as n rpl^mecl 
ov- r hi s e l f to the noint of bewilder ° n rrbnn 
he cane to grapple in thought ^ ich the u n l i k e ; 
he s c a r c e l y knew "ny longer h i t h e r h^ was a 
s t r a n g e r m a s t e r than Typhon or i f h i s nntune 
par took oC s e ^ t h i n ^ d i v i n e . /h^t <nen rlxd he 
l a c k ? The co ujciousness of s in • . • •fl 19 
f a i t h complexes ;he r e l a u i o n s h i n by o o s i t i n g i t s e l f 
and the reby sgso s i n . ITever theiess , l loorar ic f a i t h 
pn "Jerlies f a i t h and i t n resupnoies reason inasnuch as 
20 
reason p o s i t s God. 
leason onus r enders poss ib le J^e a h s x r d i t y of 
the "doubV* move "Mnt l f . And *rhst i s r e a s o n ' s r o l e in 
regard t o the I b a r r a I t s e l f ? Tn rj 11 oso h i o a l 
yragmenysi Kierkegaard a l l u d e s t o the God-nan as the 
Absolute Paradox. Inasnuch as Chr i s t i s God he i s 
u n l i k e xxn and the u n l i k e n e s s c o n s i s t s in raan fs 
s i n f u l n e s s * Man i n himself cannot beco ^ c o r d o n s 
of h i s s i n f u l n e s s . rfhe consc iousness of s in must be 
preceded ry/ the cond i t i on of f a i t h which pan can 
r ece ive only from Chr i s t the teacher* In o rde r t o 
be nan fs t e a c h e r , t h e r e f o r e , God annuls tae d i f f e r e n c e 
between man and himself so as t o unders tand him b e t t e r . 
19 F r a ' i m r t s , r>. 58. 
20 In terms of che aifaeres of e x i s t e n c e , t h i s r e l a t i o n s h 
i s expressed as the i n c i i s i o n of the a e s t h e t i c a l and 
the e t h i c a l in the r e l i g i o u s * 
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Thij then i s uhe d m l aspect of the para lo t ; chat i t 
reveals oie absolute unlikeness between n -nn Hod 
and in com~ so annul" tne di f ference. Jew, reason 
by xuseif c nnot conceive of an absolute PHLikeness. 
I t postulates the Fnknown as uhe absolutely d i f ferent 
but in ^ealin^ wxin s^ch a concent i t convar s che 
absolute dxs i i i e txo i in io a difference i t c n conceive. 
n h i s u s t be so for reason cannoc ahsolpxalv transcend 
i t s o un l i i i i t ^ . f?ae knowledge of the Paradox nust 
uhex^efore be ^ranted by thp Paradox i t s e l f . 
Reason, then, cannot conceive of the Paradox 
but ipu c 0 3l<in snoh nowled^e froF the Pa re do:: i t s e l f , 
3ut to be aware of uie Pairadox i s not necessar i ly to 
acce t i t . Heason *ay rebel against uhe Paradox and 
react to i t in ofTence as to the Absurd• But :he 
absurdi ty i s not reason f s discovery out che nature of 
the Paradox i t s e l f . The Paradox reveals i t s e l f to 
reason es the naradoxicel and the absurd as i t 
voitchsafes to reason a gliropsc of complete unl ike-
neos. Idle of e*c* thus i<* an "acoust ical i l l u s i o n " • 
Thus in of nnoo reason acknowledgei che ensolute 
unliken^ss of uhe Paradox. Bat then the absolute ly 
mlike * - a e c x ^ i y tnat towards which reason s t r i v e s 
in i t s lf n^radoxica] passion11* Tr^ re fore in the 
M)iipx of ^as^ion reason '*rasps the Paradox as the 
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Paradox; *his ffh- oy passion11 in wbxcu reason 
sur re iders i t s e l f amid uhe ^arado c "bestows itself1 1 
i s fai ,h. In the encounter *Titb the Absurd, tnerefor^ , 
reason yie lds mat i lot repudiated* i t x€% present 
in the u n o n as uhe **acoor of t e i s i o n . Too notion 
of the consume n on of reason in Christ ian f ° i t h i s 
sumiied up thu > in the Pranments: 
"But c~n such a paradox be cenoeived? ... The 
ieason w i l l doubules" find i t i rr"os c ible to 
conceive iht co Id not i t s e l f nave discovered 
i t , aid wnen i t hears i t announced wi l l not be 
aole to understand i t , sensing n^rely tha t i t s 
do hi£all i s threatened. In so far una reason 
wi l l have imcb xo ursre anainst i t ; and t Q t we 
nave on the o t ^ r hand seen th it the l eas on, in 
i t s paradoxical passion, prec ise lv des i res i t s 
own do x i fa i i . But t h i s un ierstandiT* I S p^eset t 
only in t u e no a nt of ^assion* Consider the 
anatomy r^ ^nted oy love, V ou^r i t i s iot the 
perfect on^. oe1 f-iove l i o s ~s zhe rro^na of 
love; btiu the irado i l ea l mssion of se l f - love 
whan at i t s htnp-st nibch w i l l s r ec i se ly i t s 
o™n do o f e l l . This i s also That love d e s i r e s , 
^o th~ o Ghe^e two are united in mutual \xa]er-
standing
 Ln Ae as^ioi of the >o«eflu, ?nd t h i s 
p rs lot] i s love . V y n l i not the i ov°r find 
bln.s conceivable? But e^ w o in se l f - love 
s t r ings froii .die co c^ ef love c p ~eiuher under-
Sban"? i t ior^BU1 ion t1 e e n r a g e xo venture i t , 
since i t mens l i s downfall. Such ts t ien xhe 
passion of love; se l f - love i s indeed submerged 
but n<rb a^ n i i , tQd; i t i -> ta *n ca uivc and 
a co r-x love 's jwylia opiny, but nyv a^ j i i cone 
io l i f e , a p] t h i s i s love fs ten^ta oion • do also 
n t h t i e Pared ox in i t s re lat ion to the ^paso^, 
only chef the >apr ion in to is case has another 
n e i e # # # # t f 21 
^ ^ ray iynys i f p . 59 - r^0* 
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Thus, once anain, faith \ae supposes reason, 
for only in the presence of reason with its limitations 
does the Paradox present itself as a Para.'1 ox and thus 
become the obi^ct of faiuh. Further, in faith 
reason thopyh "submerge1 is not annihilated" and is 
present as the constant indication of uncertainty 
against which faiuh rust be ^rpetually c^i^a-ye^ in a 
running battle. 
"If I wish to ^reserve myself in faith 1 must 
constantly be intent upon holdiny fast the 
objective uncertainty, so as to rervln out upon 
the deeo, ov r seventy thousand fathoms of 
water still nresorvin^ «y faith.11 22 
In Christian faiuh, the dan ^ r is raannificd beyond 
measure for the objective uncertainly -ives p^ a.ce to 
an objective certainty that the Paradox is absurd. 
11
 It is certain mly that it is absurd, and 
precisely on that account it invites to an 
infinitely yreater tension in the corresponding 
inwardness, ^he Socratic inwardness in 
existinx is an analogue to faith; only that the 
inwardness of faith, corresponding as it does, 
not to the repulsion of Socratic ignorance, 
but to the repulsion exerted by the Absurd, is 
infinitely more profound.11 23 
Faith entails a risk but the risk only strengthens 
faith uhe nore. 1l?or without risk .here is no faith 
PA 
and the (creator che r i sk the greater the f a i t h ; #.#ft 
cL id V/ . d . a/ . , P . l O f . l 
23 I b i d , u . 184. 
24 I b i d , p . 188. 
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II. Faith, thus, xs not the abrogation of reason but 
the destiny reason chooses for itself. Hy virtue of 
its "paradoxical passion11 reason converts itself into 
the !lluipan cownon sense11 which is Jiierh-xxaard1 s 
touchstone of the existential, it is from the 
standpoint of the existential thinker that he exposes 
the inadequacy of the dominant philosophy of hie 
day. He as.ks re yarding the Hegelian: 
"Do^s he in fact exist? And if he does, does 
he not face the future? And does he aver face 
the future by way of action? . ..Pait if he ever 
acts J^rrm emiiPte'jttif does he in that case fa.ee 
the fiTtiirb with inTinite mas- ion? is there not 
for "ni *. ^y\ oith"r/or? Is it not cbn case that 
eternity is for an excxsbipg individual not 
eternity, but the future, and that eiornitv is 
eternity only for the eternal who is not in 
process of oecoiiny? . ..V/as he born sub yy^c^ie 
axytern^ i, c-2)^ ha , be lived grub specie aoterni 
since. •*• .never having had enyt^n^zo^^o^vi^Gh 
x h e future, <•n d n ever havin™ e xoerience d an y 
decision?" 25 
The exiacential is the decisive; to exist is to 
act; wan is not sub specia aetertii^ But to 3ay this 
is not to inply that_the existing individual does not 
think. To act is to function as an integral human 
being, as an "entire man11. The self that decides 
is not merely the cogitative self but the -entire 
self of which Imagination and feeiinx are as much a 
part as thought* Therefore "the task is not to exalt 
the one at the expense of the other, but togi?e them, 
25 O.TI.P., p. 271 - 2?2. 
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an equal statxu, to unify them in simultaneity; the 
26 iiedlun in which they are unified is existence.11 
^he existing inlividual must think inasmuch as 
exi 4tnice itself co bines thought wich acuion. His 
distinction lies not in che absence of thought but 
in Ghe realisation ^mx his o n exi^teice is the 
solo 003ecu of thought. His task is xo understand 
himself. This "XIBZ necessarily he so for every 
reality ot^or thmmi \ ±z o^ n is related to bin only ae 
a possibility. In chinkin^, he abstracts existence 
from the actual and reanoes it to a cos ibility* But 
in thinixiig hi 5 on existence, ie cannot reduce him-
self to an abstraction for he is not totally an 
object of thought for hinself. Existence intervenes 
to render thinking intermittent for existeice is a 
movoiienfc, a becoiiin^ , and thought has 10 category to 
reflect it; indeed it cannot do so for thouxht ieals 
ii categories. By virtue of chis reason the existing 
27 individual "...thinks before and aiter11* Thus for 
the existing thinker his own reality is not effaced 
in thinki3g# Therefore "the only reality in which an 
existing individual nay have a ^elation chat is more 
than cognitive is his own reality, the fact tfcrt he 
exists; fnis reality contitutes his absolute interest. 
26 Q.U.P., p. 311• 
27 Ibidt p. 293. 
28 ibid, p. 230* 
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Existence is a process and therefore the 
existinx individual c nnot give it coitinuity merely 
in thought, i/hat then holds together the individual 
existence? The element of continuity in existence 
is passion, wherein the entire personality asserts 
itself as a unity. And passion expresses itself 
as decisiveness, therefore flthe goal of novenent 
for an existinx i xiividual is to arrive at a decision 
29 
and renew it11. - The task proper to existential 
thinking is therefore the ethical and in this realiza-
tion lins the greatness of Socrates; for wSocrates was... 
a man whose energies were devoted to thinking; but he 
reduced all oth->r knowledge to indifference in that 
50 ho infinitely accentuated ethical knowledge". 
In decisiveness, then, the self is concretised 
and consolidated inas luch as it affirms itself in its 
passion as an entity endowed not merely with thought, 
feeling or imagination but with all three. Thus, 
flif only the choice is posited, all of 
the a.estbetic"l returns a^ain and you will 
see that only tnen does existence become 
beautiful, that only in fnis way can a nan 
succeed in savins his soul and gaining the 
whole world without abusing itfl• 31 
In contenpla/tinx this self as a reality thomght 
invests it with a horizon, with possibilities the 
self must realise. Thus, 
29 OJhhM p. 277* 
30 Ibid, p. 201• 
31 Jji/O. 11» p . 182. 
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"This e p i c a l r e a l i t y i s che only r e a l i t y 
vbict dors not becone a rn r ° p o s s i b i l i t y 
through be in'* lno-mf and which o?n be kno^n 
only chrough being thought; Tor i t la che 
i id ivi iXial1 s o?n r e a l i t y . Before i t beoaxie 
a r e a l i t y i t was known by bin in too Con11 of 
a conceived r e a l i t y and hence as a p o s s i b i l i t y . 
The task of exLSuaotial t h ink i i ^ f tb&refc*o, i s 
GO uhink tae e : i lea l for i t i s in decision l" t the 
se l f acquires doom ipf concretion, m^ ^rasos the 
trinf in i t s ov" i n t e r i o r i t y . Truth i s sub jec t iv i ty 
and sub jec t iv i ty i s i w a r d n e s s . Viewed fre.i this 
standpoint t]~e Incxreacion ener^es as the - o s t 
c ruc ia l exi xjemcx^l y^oblm 'or xz repels t % o u r i t end 
stands out i s ai t nee IT ao "isin^ e i t h e r / o r . The 
o r r i n 0 1 i n ' i v i ^ T»i mmt e i t he r accent i t or r e jec t 
i t and * ' T cheT r a l t n r r i t i v ^ **o chooses, ' e * i"" *r oes 
a n?of oun n irr isxkw* "^ion. ^he indinix c A omrm*r*es 
sur^wfc^ieu wn hi > Hod-relationship ^or in counten-
ajoin* the dio junction he places hinself decisive!^ 
before rj-od e io l e r in fa i th or i n s i n . I ierk^gaard 
* ' r i t e s : 
llrf1o understand onesei m existence is a lso 
the O h r t ' t i 0 ! pr inc ip le , e^ce^t Ghat t h i s f,selC!! "as received far r i cher a^d deeper 
deoer i n a t i o n , c t i l l nore ^ i f f i on l t to 
unlersuned, ip con.junccion with ex is tence . 
The bel i^v ^ i s a subj^ct iv 0 ubinker. . .here 
a Piin Air "self11 i s nou huaanit^ in ' - e ie ra l , 
or sub jec t iv i ty in ^ n n r a l f in which case 
evaryt^xn^ becomes eas^ oecause che d i f f i cu l t y 
i s re^o/ed, and the Twhoie t°sk transposed GO 
XO e P P ~n 91/1 
J C ^ # t # L # , p . c. O - . 
t1 •* rea l of t h e abs t rac t thought wi ub i t s 
3] adow-ooxi^rn nae d i f f i cu l ty i s r re?cor 
thp-i ic w^s foe xhe Creek, for s t i l l ^ r a r i e r 
c in ^Txanieln ens are conioinod, existence 
beeonn^ accentuated pprado^ i i n l ly as s i n , 
an 1 e t e r n i t y accen uuated oara^o "icali"7, as 
Goo * t t i ^eB ^ho d i f f i cu l ty o n i i i t r i i 
ax i s t in^ in s ch c"te r foriec f iot in absuraci l~ 
thinki T o iese l f 0 t of tne 1, abs t r ac t ly 
uhint i n " , r or oxann le f about an e te rna l Crod-
beconing zid such l i k e , a l l of which ideas 
ener re as soon ar* i r e d i f f i cu l ty i s xalien 
away. As a conseouence, the b e l i e v e r ' s 
existence i s s t i l l nore 0 s^lcna^e thun ihe 
exixteice of uhe Gre-k philosopher, ^Tho 
needed a hi^h de rea of passion even in r e l a -
t ion 00 his ateraxy; for existence ^ x m a t e s 
oasslon, hut eriscence oaradoxic l l y accentu-
ated ^eneranes una maximum oassion.11 33 
^hrou^h his rrOd~rela.iion -hip the be l iever r e -
af f i r is the ou ' i c 1 for lf uhe t rue d i s t o r t i o n between 
road and e v i l . . . e x i s t s only in the individual aid 
in the l a s t m a i r s i a only in each individual in h i s 
34 God-rele ^ionshlp11 • ffhe i ^ i v i ^ u a l t1 us kiows 
1
 inse l f in tne only \my poss ib le , whic^ i s through 
?raspinrj* himself in decis iveness . But when Ke m^s 
so in faich £cysu
 isxrijctissi-piQ wherein the object 
i s not Christ ian ±00 urine but Christ himself, he 
i s taken h r d i e r then xts o* n self ; he not only 
af f i rns himself but ^ also affirms another and 
thereby kxiows bin . ifor uhe object of fa i ch here i s 
Chris t , toe G-od-wan. ^brou^h the Tp&^rna ,ion he has 
annulled th^ di f fere ice between an and God and has 
33 G,U.P.9 P . 317* 
3?r Ib id , p . 139* 
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rendered himself knowable in ,faitb, for the reality 
of a self other than onefs own con only be k^own 
in faith. For, 
ftthe object of faith is the reality of 
another, and the relationship is one of 
infinite interest. The object of faith is 
not a doctrinp for then the relationship 
would be intellectual, and it would bo of 
imoortance not to botch it, but to realise 
the maximum intellectual relationship. The 
obiect of faith is not a teacher with a 
doctrine; for alien a teacher has a doctrine, 
the doctrine is e£ ipso more important than 
the teacher, and th* relationship is anain 
intellectual, and it amain becones important 
not GO botch it, but to realise uhe maximum 
intellectual relationship. The object of 
faith is the reality of the teacher that the 
teacher really exists. The answer of faith 
is therefore unconditionally yes ox* no..* it 
is the answer to a question concerninr a facts 
fl)o you or do you not suppose thaxt he really 
existed?1 and the answer, it must be noted, is 
with infinite passion* In the case of a 
human being it is thoughtlessness to lay so 
greaxt and infinite a stress on the question 
whether he has existed or not. If the object 
of faith is a human bein°°f therefore, the 
whole proposal is the vagary of a stupid per-
son who has not even understood the spirit of 
the intellectu i and the aesthetic. The object 
of faith is hence the reality of the God-nan in 
the sense of-his existence. But existence 
involves first and foremost particularity, and 
this is Vi'hy thought must abstract from existence, 
because the a -rticular cannot be thought but 
only the universal. The object of faith is thus 
G-odfs realit" in existence as a particular 
individual, the fact that God has existed as an 
in divi duai hu i; xn ae in g •l! 35 
Thus, in the notion of Christian faith the 
discord between reason and faith is resolved. Reason 
35 C.U.P., p. 2f;o. 
i s t r a n s anted and a s s i ned IGS proper p lace as a 
"co-ordinate 1 1 in uhe hanionious r e a l i t y tha t i s an 
i n d i v i d u a l . An thereby i s redeemed one of mankind1 
3 JOS t va luab l e in s i - hits: t h a t 
" the ^rna i s not h igher t^an the rood and 
the b e a u t i f u l , uut foe t r u e and ;be ~ood 
and the heavt iCul h^lo^x es~ee u i a l l y GO 
every bpLian e x i s t e n c e , and a re u n i f i e d f o r 
an e x x k i i w i nixvi n a i not in fhoaglit but 
1" exi ~ ce^ce.11 5^ 
36 C.U.P . , n . 311 . 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Kierkegaard Sources used in Thejsis 
Either/Ors Doubleday 1959, Anchor paperback A 181 a*-b, trans-
lated by David F« and Lillian Marvin Swenson and Walter 
Lowrie. Translations and notes revised together with a 
forward by Howard A. Johnson. 
Fear and Trembling & The Sickness unto Death, Doubleday 1954, 
Anchor paperback A 30, translated by Walter Lowrie. 
Translation revised by Howard A, Johnson* 
Philosophical Fragments, Princeton University Press 1963* 
Originally translated and introduced by David F. Swenson; 
new introduction and commentary by Niels Thulstrup; 
translation revised and commentary translated by Howard V. 
Hong* 
The Concept of Dread, 1844, Princeton University Press 1944. 
Translated by Walter Lowrie; 2nd edition, translation 
revised by Howard A* Johnson* 1957* 
Stages on Life*s_Way, 1845, Princeton University Press 1940• 
Translated by Walter Lowrie• 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, 
1846, Princeton University Press 1941* Translated by David 
F, Swenson and Walter Lowrie* Published for the American 
Scandinavian Foundation. 
Works ofLove, Harper & Row 1962. Translated with an intro-
duction and notes by Edna and Howard Hong* 
Training in Christianity, 1850, Oxford University Press# 
(New York) 1941. Translated by Walter Lowrie. This volume 
also contains An Edifying Piscourse, 1850. 
The Point of View for My Work as anAuthor, 1859, Oxford 
University Press (New York) 1939; newly edited with a 
Preface by Benjamin Nelson, Harper & Row 1962, Torchbook 
paperback TB 88. 
Secondary Kierkegaard Sources 
Collins, James. The Mind of Kierkegaard> Gateway Edition, 
(Chicago? Henry Regnery Company, 1953). 
Dupre, Louis. Kierkegaard as Theologian^ (New York? Sheed and 
Ward, 1963). 
Lowrie, Walter. A Short Life of Kierkegaard. (Princeton! 
Princeton University Press, 1942)# 
